Comments forty years later

This booklet was compiled for whatever Chilean support group which might arise to use in garnering support for the Chilean people from students at the University of Toronto in the late fall of 1973. It was a total failure in that regard and those who even considered it felt that an anthropologist should restrict himself to dealing with the effects of the coup on the Mapuche Indians (of whom I knew nothing). They also, validly, were very leery about relying upon what seemed to be largely Canadian and American news sources for documentation. In point of fact I knew very little about contemporary Chile and I probably should have resisted any attempt to write about the coup and what followed; however it also triggered a turning point in my own life.

I was fairly active in trying to evoke some support from students at Scarborough College (University of Toronto) but this too was a total failure. My efforts often evoked sneering responses from many students and the backing of almost no one. It was this response which led me to give up university teaching and return to work at various jobs in British Columbia, which I did the following year. I also began to write a series of books about the lives of working people in the British Columbia, which proved to be the single contribution to memory I made in my life. This booklet was originally issued under my father's name, Al Frommknecht, whom had then recently died,

General Pinochet, the head of the Chilean armed forces and the putsch leader remained in power for more than twenty years. He made a triumphal tour of Europe in his later years after stepping down from power and naturally visited Great Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, a firm supporter of Chilean fascism. There he was met by an arrest warrant issued by the then socialist government of Spain, which he evaded with the help of the then British 'Labour' prime minister Tony Blair. Even after
a truly remarkable decision of the British House of Lords to extradite Pinochet to Spain, Blair permitted him to return to Chile where he lived out his final years in comfort. In justice he should have been tried and executed for his direction of the mass murder of Chileans.

What remained of the Chilean left (at home and in exile) finally agreed upon the total of those murdered by he fascists in Chile--some twelve to thirteen thousand people, not counting the additional multi-thousands who were arrested, tortured, maimed and imprisoned. It seems a very minimal figure.

For some years during the early twenty-first century a very moderate and mild social democrat government was allowed to function in Chile but was bound by so many restrictions and limitations that it could not accomplish anything and lost most support it had had. Chile then returned to the Conservative fold. Most of the former activists of the left had by then either been murdered, had emigrated, had escaped into exile or had been reduced to living in poverty in Chile. The 'return to democracy' was of course hailed by the North American press, where they showed any interest in Chile at all. Virtually none of the political murderers, the police and military death squads nor the torturers and organizers of Chilean fascism were ever brought to trial or punished for their horrendous crimes. Fascism in Chile did not last for forty days but now for more than forty years.

Rolf Knight
2014
The First Forty Days of Fascism in Chile

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As compiled from reports in the "reputable" Western Press. Including extracts from the New York Times, the London Observer, Le Monde (English edition), the Toronto Star, Newsweek, Der Spiegel, the Globe and Mail, Der Stern, the Washington Post, Latin America (London), and others.

Al Frommknecht
January 1974


Introduction

This booklet provides extracts and summaries of reports by members of the "world press" which document the establishment of a fascist regime in Chile in the month following September 11, 1973. The accounts are drawn exclusively from the "reputable" press of five North American and Western European countries. This is a composite record of what leading journalists saw and reported from Chile in the first weeks, when the shock of recognition of what fascism means overcame their caution and their editors' rewriting. The reports come from sources which by no sane stretch of the imagination can be labeled as pro-communist, socialist or leftist. Their accounts are an unretractable record which some now wish to gloss over or forget.

Three months after the putsch, while the killings and repressions are still in full swing, the move to sweep events in Chile under the rug is already well underway. Already we see the rewriting of events and cosmetic obfuscation by more pliable and more circumspect journalists. Reporters and editors are already beginning the old refrain that the generals have brought a necessary return to stability and that the repression involved has been much exaggerated by leftist sympathizers of the Popular Unity government. However, the earlier eyewitness accounts are on record. These earlier accounts, although not ideologically formless, are clear in that they document the establishment of a classic fascist regime in Chile, as horrendous as any. When carefully read, they tell in some detail of what happened, who supports the putsch and who bears the brunt of the assault of fascism. This booklet provides a small part of that record.

It is beyond the scope of this booklet to outline the social, economic and political forces at work in Chili before and during the Popular Unity government and its attempt to make a peaceful transition to socialism. It does not treat with the successes and failures of the Allende government’s attempts to govern constitutionally against the assaults of an increasingly fascist inspired ruling and middle class. Possibly a summation of the three year background to the coup is by the North American Congress of Latin Americanists report, New Chile, 1973 edition and Facing the Blockade.

Nor does this booklet pursue the massive evidence of the widespread involvement of the U.S. in the preparation, support and instigation of the putsch. Such U.S. involvement includes fully or partially verified actions
such as: a) massive funding of anti-Allende political parties over a series of elections; b) provision of funds and support to buy off judges and legislators in an attempt to block the ascension to power of an elected Popular Unity government; c) organizing the assassination of Rene Schneider and other army commanders unwilling to allow a coup; d) mobilizing a trans-capitalist financial and economic blockade of Chile; e) organizing economic shortage and funding inflation in Chile; f) organizing and funding strikes and lockouts of essential services; g) funding and supplying arms and trained agents to right-wing terrorist teams; h) encouraging the armed forces and civilian organizations in Chile to mount a coup; and i) sending a "coup team" of American diplomats and attaches to Chile who had previously advised and coordinated military takeovers and mass repression in Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Indonesia, the Congo, and elsewhere. For a documentation of these facets of Chilean-American relations see Chile: The Story Behind the Coup, North American Congress of Latin Americanists, October 1973. Full verification of American participation will probably have to wait until the servants of that gangster state write their memoirs or historians produce obscure dissertations. But enough is known already to make fundamental U.S. involvement clear.

Still, however massive and ruthless the American role in preparing the Chilean putsch, and the barbarism now in progress there, the coup was carried out by Chileans. Without the decision of large and substantial sectors of the Chilean upper and middle classes to opt for fascism rather than accept a democratic and peaceful transition to socialism, American intervention would have been fruitless.

Immediate Background to the Putsch

_Chile is not, and was never, a banana republic. Almost unique in Latin America, it is a developed, sophisticated, even a prim country. It is--or it was--a 'decent' middleclass democracy in which the Army saw its own values safely embodied. An old fashioned country, in which old fashioned disparities of wealth persisted: while the better-off enjoyed their gardens and their democracy, the country's laborers and small peasants lived in misery, often in settlements of unorganized and uneducated laborers which developed in belts around the cities._
The socialist tradition in Chile was an old one. It was nourished, and associated with patriotism, by the feature which marks Chile off from European societies and consigns her to the side of the Third World in its struggles against the industrialized powers; her overwhelming economic dependence on raw materials, like copper, owned by foreign firms, to be exported in return for food and manufactured goods. Marxist socialism had become a familiar political alternative in Chilean politics when in October 1970, Salvador Allende became President.

Allende was able to achieve much in his three years. In the face of American attempts to subvert the regime, he nationalized the copper mines and the great foreign corporations like ITT. The 'Popular Unity' government carried through widespread nationalization of Chilean firms and successfully reformed land tenure by breaking up the large estates and distributing land to the peasants. As recently as March, the coalition surprised even itself by increasing its vote in the congressional elections to nearly 44 percent.

The events of 11 September had a dress rehearsal last year. The extreme Right, especially the Patria y Libertad group, developed a coherent strategy—they would organize transport strikes, cutting off food supplies, encourage riots and provocations against the Army, and thus bring the Army out of its political neutrality into a position in which it felt it must intervene. ..... This September plot of 1972 failed, and Allende bought time by bringing leading military officers into his cabinet. But this year the strategy worked.

On June 29 (1973) there was an abortive coup by fewer than 150 army troops. The Commanders in Chief of the army, navy and air force threw their support behind President Allende, and his position in the immediate aftermath of the attempt appeared to have been strengthened. Yet the coup was a turning point.

The instruments that the armed forces used to assert their political power was a relatively ignored arms control law passed after the March elections. It gave the military complete independence in carrying out
weapons searches. ... The measure was applied exclusively against leftist strongholds in agrarian and industrial areas.

.......... 

This military activity coincided with an offensive mounted against the Government by the same lower-middle and middle class 'unions' that banded together last October. For more than 50 days, up to last week, the country's economy was paralyzed by 40,000 striking truck owners. They were joined at times by the 140,000 shopkeepers and small businessmen, most of the country's physicians, and more than 90,000 professional workers. They would settle for nothing less than the President's removal; when he refused to resign, they openly called for a military coup.

The London Observer, September 16, 1973

It is essential to recognize that the putsch was prepared and carried out not merely by a small (but powerful) section of the Chilean oligarchy and reaction. In large measure, the putsch and its aftermath were the embodiment of the decision of large sections of the Chilean middle classes and their hangers-on, who finally opted for fascist repression rather than accept a democratic transition to socialism.

The Chilean Junta, and its supporters at home and abroad, claim that the overthrow of the Popular Unity government was carried out to protect the freedom and order and legality which were threatened by the Allende government. They would hold that the increasing violence and economic dislocation which developed required that the military step in to "save the nation." But it is already clear that the leadership of the Chilean armed forces, along with the business, professional and middle class organizations, were fundamentally involved in the campaign of economic sabotage and terrorism mounted against the Popular Unity government during the final year. The leading elements of the major "moderate" political party, the Christian Democrats, were also deeply involved.

Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan Take-Over

Middle-ranking officers of all three military services began plotting the coup against President Salvador Allende as far back as November 1972, conversations with officers and civilians close to the situation have revealed.
The officers planning the coup, which resulted in the death of President Allende on September 11, held discussions with each other and with middle class union and business leaders.

By August of this year, the military leaders had rejected any thought of a civilian political solution and had encouraged middle class "unions" to continue their prolonged strike against Dr. Allende's government to set the stage for a military take-over.

"We would have acted even if Allende had called a plebiscite or reached a compromise with the political Opposition" said an officer deeply involved in the plotting of the coup.

Although the actual order for the coup was given on the afternoon of September 10, military garrisons throughout the country had been put on alert about 10 days before. To make certain that there no breakdowns in the armed forces, officers considered loyal to the Allende government were placed under arrest when the take-over began. ...

The details of the military coup were given and cross-checked in separate conversations with officers of all three services and with civilians who had kept themselves closely informed of developments as the coup was being hatched. The informants ask that their names not be revealed or their service branches cited.

........

But these officers asserted that the first attempts to coordinate action in the army, navy and air force against the Allende government grew out of a 26-day general strike of business and transportation in October 1972. The strike ended when Dr. Allende invited General Carlos Prats Gonzales, the army's commander in chief, and two other officers, into the Cabinet.

But almost immediately, General Prats came to be viewed as favorable to the Allende government. By late November (1972) army and air force colonels and navy commanders began to map out the possibilities of a coup. They also contacted leaders of the truck owners, shopkeepers and professional associations, as well as key businessmen, who had backed the October strike.

The plotting subsided somewhat in the weeks of political campaigning leading to the March legislative election. The civilian opposition to Dr. Allende thought it could emerge with two-thirds of the legislative seats and thus impeach the President.

"It was supposed to be a last chance for a political solution," one officer admitted. "But frankly, many of us gave a sigh of relief when the Marxists
achieved such a high vote because we felt that no politician could run the country and that eventually the Marxists would be even stronger."

New York Times, September 27, 1973

Open demonstrations of the alliance of "traditional" middle class leaders and the putsch plotters appeared during the last months of the Popular Unity government.

The "democratic legislators from the Christian Democrat and the National parties passed a resolution in the Congress on August 22 (1973) calling the Allende government "illegitimate" and suggesting that the military men who had re-entered the cabinet in early August should separate themselves from Allende and the Popular party.

...........

As one member of the National Party put it to journalists on August 28, "Even if we must kill 20,000 enemies in order to liquidate the government, we must be ready to do it."

...........

The paramilitary squads of the ultra-right were adding their unique contribution as well. Patria y Libertad, the fascist clandestine movement responsible for much of the sabotage attempts of the past, undertook an enlarged campaign of bombings, assassinations and subversion in August. They bombed a pipeline, wounding 17 workers, assassinated Arturo Aray, Allende's aide de camp and attacked the Nopare, a movement of truck drivers favoring the government who were transporting primary necessities and fuel in defiance of the truck owner's strike. The headquarters of the Trade Union Federation were bombed, as were the North Korean and Cuban embassies.

The police captured the leader of Patria y Libertad, Roberto Thieme, in August, as he dined in an expensive suburban restaurant.

Latin American Working Group (Toronto) Sept. 14, 1973

According to later accounts by Time, the New York Times and Newsweek, this same Roberto Thieme was sheltered by police and less than one month later was seen heading army Squads who were "interrogating" Popular Unity supporters imprisoned after the coup.
The Putsch and Dissolution of the Elected Government

Final preparations for the putsch began during the first days of September. The signal went out on September 10, when the bulk of the Chilean navy sailed to join elements of the U.S. fleet standing nearby for what were described as "combined training maneuvers". During the early morning of September 11 the Chilean ships returned to Valparaiso, disembarked marines and with troops from the local garrison, captured the city against only scattered and uncoordinated resistance.

Within the first few hours the putschists seized control of virtually all army, navy, air force and police garrisons in the country. A combined force of over 100,000 well armed and well trained men who, in the overwhelming majority, knew where their sympathies lay. Previous purges by the leaders of the armed forces, which were never fully under the control of the Popular Unity government, had already removed those members of the military who might oppose the putsch.

Only a very small number of Chilean military men remained loyal to the elected Popular Unity government. They were either arrested or executed by their military colleagues. The putschists later boasted of the well-organized and highly coordinated manner in which they seized military power.

Eduardo Paredes, a socialist and head of the National Police, was murdered in his home by a squad of military hit men during the first hour of the putsch. Individual enlisted men and junior officers in garrisons of provincial towns and cities who attempted to block the coup in their own units were either killed on the spot or overwhelmed and, in general, court martialed and executed soon after. In Santiago, cadets of the San Bernadino infantry school remained loyal to the government but were overwhelmed after many hours of fighting. An unknown number of the survivors were shot. *(Der Spiegel, October 8, 1973)* In general, however, the members of the Chilean military proved to be unremarkably favorable to the putsch and carried out the lessons which the more than 4,000 officers who had been trained in U.S. military schools had been taught.

News of the putsch reached President Allende at 7 a.m., September 11. He rushed from his residence to the Moneda, the Chilean Capital Buildings and the symbol of Chilean electoral democracy until that time. The only armed support immediately present was from 30 to 40 members of the Grupo de Amigos, a civilian organization of supporters pledged to protect Allende from civilian and from military assassins. Allende and the Grupo
de Amigos were able to secure the Moneda before it was seized by the Junta. Its defense was to be symbolic of the defense of democracy in Chile. From the Moneda, Allende attempted to mobilize armed resistance to the putsch. But the military, the forces of law and order and the real rulers of the old regime had all thrown in behind the fascists.

A series of messages were then broadcast on those radio stations not yet in the hands of the military. The Popular Unity government called on the workers of Chile to occupy factories and key points throughout Santiago and the rest of the country. To defend themselves and their government where possible.

Lightly armed groups of workers and supporters of the Popular Unity government began to occupy factories and public buildings in Santiago within the hour. They were strengthened by members of the M.I.R., a party to the left of the Popular Unity government which had long expected a coup. Armed combat between defenders of the Popular Unity government and the Junta troops began at that time on the edge of the district housing the Moneda and other government buildings. Allende's worst fears about the unequal contest between partly armed workers defending their government against the assault of a unified, modern military began to come true.

By 10 a.m. Junta troops had reached the environs of the Moneda and General Pinochet, the headman of the Junta forces and a former Military Attache to the Chilean embassy in Washington, issued an ultimatum of immediate surrender. The Junta offered Allende asylum in exile on the condition of immediate and total capitulation of the Popular Unity government and its supporters. Unlike other Latin American presidents, Allende refused to surrender. Knowing that his own life was inexorably linked to the aspirations and loyalty of the Chilean working people, Allende refused to abandon them. He said as much in the final communiqué which left the Moneda. His last radio message asked the Chilean people to defend their government and their interests as best they could. "I will fight to the end."

The main assault on the Moneda began shortly after, as a large force of tank-supported army troops started to push back or eliminate defenders in the surrounding governmental buildings. The battle for the Moneda itself lasted for approximately to hours. It was held against tanks, bazookas and infantry by approximately 30 members of the Grupo de Amigos, by President Allende and some of his government aides. At about
12 a.m. the Chilean air force began bomb and rocket attacks on the Moneda, setting it on fire. Resistance continued.

During a brief lull in the fighting the last persons to survive the defense of the Moneda, including Allende's daughter, managed to escape through a corridor of adjoining buildings. At 1:50 p.m. Junta troops finally stormed the Moneda.

Those are the bare bones of the first stages of the putsch and the resistance to it. Those wee the "facts" on which the reporters from the major North American and European newspapers agreed. Various elaborated, with different background information and with individual speculations as to the intent and purpose of the parties involved, essentially similar accounts appeared in the New York Times, September 14 and 16, 1973; in the London Observer, September 16; in Der Spiegel, September 17; in Newsweek, September 24, 1973 and in numerous other accounts in the Western press.

The events which followed the storming of the Moneda by Junta troops are somewhat more contentious. It may be inappropriate to dwell on the way an elected popular president and a handful of his supporters died when thousands of ordinary Chileans also were murdered, tens of thousands beaten and tortured and hundreds of thousands cast into misery.

Allende and his closest advisors were killed shortly after Junta troops overwhelmed the Moneda. The initial communique from the Junta was that Allende had "committed suicide", variously by a pistol and by a sub-machine gun. This was attested to by a Junta doctor who did the autopsy.

Augusto Olivares, a close personal friend of Allende, was also found to be a "victim of suicide", by similar means.

The one member of the international press who managed to see Allende's body immediately after the storming of the Moneda (a Gerhard Bisenkolb) reported that:

About three hours after the ultimatum, soldiers stormed the Government Palace. Two Chilean journalists and I ran after them. There was shooting everywhere.

We came upon Allende's body in the red hall. His head had been mutilated beyond identification. I saw several bullet wounds in the dead man's back and shoulders.

London Observer, September 23, 1973

A related, if not fully verified, account comes from the Amnesty International (cited in Der Stern, September 1973). The Amnesty account
reports that about a dozen prisoners taken in the Moneda were beaten and kicked to death by Junta troops in the courtyard of the Moneda shortly after the building fell.

Simultaneous with the murder of President Allende and the Popular Unity supporters at the Moneda and elsewhere was the repeated bombing of Allende's official residence, from which the President's immediate family narrowly escaped. Allende's body was immediately secreted--no outside observer was allowed to see it--and buried the next day in a sealed coffin in an unmarked grave.

The treatment of Allende's remains, although a minor counterpoint to the continuing butchery by the putschists, is nevertheless indicative of their mentality.

Allende's body lies in a tomb marked with the name of another person. ... Elaborate care was employed to keep the location of Allende's tomb secret. The sailors guarding it moved around and refused to specify which gravesite they were charged with guarding.

Toronto Star, September 28, 1973

Allende's official residence was looted and wrecked a few days after his death by the police and by gangs of Junta supporters. A week later General Pinochet announced that the building would be demolished to remove all vestiges of Allende's occupancy and that a chapel would be built on the site to commemorate the "return of democracy to Chili." (New York Times, September 18, 1973)

The Armed Forces Versus the Chilean Working Class

The Chilean putsch is not just another Latin American palace coup. Resistance to the Junta forces has been more massive and determined than in any other case in recent Latin American history. Despite the speed and overwhelming military superiority of the Junta forces, Chilean workers mounted open resistance for five days and nights. In factories, schools and in most of the working class districts around Santiago. Defended by uncoordinated, lightly armed men and women, these locales were subdued by bombing, tanks, artillery, helicopter gunships and drawn out street fighting. The defense of the Popular Unity government--"heroic defense" is the only possible adjective--by the working people of Santiago made the class nature of the struggle against the putsch immediately clear.
Allende's death did not bring an immediate end to the fighting, and throughout the week the military used every weapon in its armory—planes, tanks, artillery and machine guns to route determined nests of snipers. Newsweek correspondent Dwight Porter cabled from Santiago that the ferocious street fighting was reminiscent of the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968. The Presidential Palace, La Moneda, is literally a shell of its former self, and demolition experts are already at work preparing to demolish it.

The brunt of the military attack, it appeared, was concentrated on factories that in recent months have been turned into arsenals by leftist workers. The Sumar textile factory in Santiago's industrial zone was repeatedly bombed by air force planes. ... Hospitals reported receiving so many dead that the bodies were just being stacked in wards.

Newsweek, September 24, 1973

A different correspondent, reporting on some of the executions which followed the defeat of a resistance group defending a Santiago University reported:

One priest informed me that on the Saturday after the coup he had managed to get into the City's Technical University, which had been the scene of heavy fighting, on the pretext of blessing the dead. He told me he saw 200 bodies, all piled together. Tales like this abound in Santiago, and though information is almost nonexistent for the rest of Chile, the presumption is that the executions have followed a similar pattern in other cities. But the morgue count alone sets the regime's kill rate at an appalling 200 Chileans a day—just for the capital.

Newsweek, October 8, 1973

The Junta leaders had earlier given a blank cheque to the military to execute all those resisting the putsch.

The junta warned today that any supporters of the dead leader (President Allende) found to be armed would be "shot on the spot if taken prisoner."

Police officials threatened to "blow up buildings if necessary" to silence snipers. A statement denounced the "pernicious attitude of some subversive elements who pretend to resist the patriotic attitude adopted by the armed forces."
The statement set a deadline for surrendering arms and added:
"All persons who insist in a suicidal and irresponsible attitude will be
definitely attacked. They will be shot on the spot if taken prisoner."

New York Times, September 13, 1973

Even today, it is not clear what and how extensive the resistance to the
Junta troops was, or what has become of those survivors of the initial
defeat of the resistance. Accounts from outside of the capital are
especially sketchy. But it is clear that armed resistance to the putsch was
scattered throughout the country.

Although it is still not clear just what resistance by armed workers
took place, or where, most reports filtering out indicate some very hard
fighting indeed in industrial and working class areas, and much higher
casualty figures than have been admitted by the new government.
According to some reports, a large-scale counter-attack by armed
workers in Valparaiso very nearly succeeded in recapturing control of
the port from marines and other military units, and was beaten off after
heavy casualties on both sides. In Santiago and elsewhere too, the
military seem to have been surprised by the level and extent of armed
resistance. ... In the end, however, the armed workers appear to have
been defeated as much by the failure of any military units to join them,
and their resultant isolation and immobilization in factories, as by the
sheer military superiority of the army.

Latin America (London), September 21, 1973

The casualty figures of the putsch and for the executions which
followed it will probably never be known exactly. They still continue to
climb. It seems now (December 1973) that however high the casualty
figures in the initial five days of fighting, and they were high, the truly
horrendous numbers of people killed were unarmed. Popular Unity
supporters killed after the main resistance to the putsch ceased. If the
numbers of deaths attributed early to the street fighting are not as high as
some early rumors suggested, it appears that the total numbers of
Popular Unity supporters murdered are even more grim than the initial
estimates claimed. The miniscule figures given out by the Junta public
relations men are not even taken seriously by Junta officers themselves.

The Legal Medical Institute announced today that a total of 476
persons had died from bullet wounds since the military coup, including 14
military men and policemen.
Unofficial estimates range from 2,000 to 20,000 dead in the sporadic resistance and wave of repression that followed the take over.

New York Times, October 5, 1973
By the end of September 1973, Junta press releases officially declared that only 284 persons had been killed during the "liberation of the country from the Marxist yoke."

But Admiral Toribio Marino (a Junta leader) himself, in an interview with the Netherland TV station Vara, acknowledged that 3,500 civilians had died. ... Just in the neighborhood of La Legua, which saw heavy fighting, inhabitants estimated at least 300 dead.

Time and time again political prisoners were shot, supposedly while "trying to escape". Fifteen prisoners taken in the vicinity of the Pudahuel airport were told, "Go, if you want to be free," and shot, as were six members of the M.I.R.

Der Spiegel, October 1, 1973
We must fully recognize the bestiality which members of a status quo threatened with a loss of their power are capable. Reaction everywhere needs no lessons or stimulus from "foreign devils" or external masters. It is salient, however, to remember that (next to Colombia) the Chilean armed forces and police received the most extensive training and "aid" from the U.S. of any of the Latin American forces. All of the Junta leaders have been delegates in military capacity to U.S. postings, 4,000 of the military officers were trained in the U.S., the units of the Chilean "elite" regiments received training in counter-insurgency warfare in the U.S. Southern Command base in Panama, and the Chilean police were extensively retrained through U.S. "technical aid" programs.

Writing one month after the putsch a columnist for the Washington Post suggested that the Chilean Junta may have had C.I.A. "advisors" from the beginning to the present.

In Santiago the generals are executing people. In Santiago, the generals say they haven't killed as many as the refugees say they have.

.......... In Washing the new government is recognized and the denials flow. After three years of using every economic level to destroy the Chilean government, there are rumors it was a Central Intelligence Agency hit man whose machine gun chattered the teeth out of President Allende's skull. Hard on those assertions we have Howard Hunt, the 20-year C.I.A. man, giving us an on-camera demonstration of the kind of people that the agency hires, promotes and commends.
If Hunt told you the C.I.A. didn't have anything to do with Watergate in Washington or (mass) murder and incarceration in Chile, would you believe him?

Toronto Star, October 10, 1973

Mass Arrests and Concentration Camps

The ongoing wave of arrests has imprisoned most of the leaders and large numbers of the active supporters of the last democratically elected government. The prisoners include most of the elected representatives of the six parties making up the Popular Unity government, cabinet ministers, administrative officials, political leaders, union leaders, peasant leaders, independent intellectuals and even some religious leaders. The hand of repression has fallen most heavily on those thousands of rank and file workers and ordinary people who openly and actively backed the Popular Unity government. The wave of arrests, executions and repressions in Chile today is more wide-ranging and brutal than ever seen on this continent. The prisons are effectively concentration camps and the repression and murders which occur in them and throughout Chili today can only be compared to the aftermath of the Nazi takeover in Germany in the 1930's.

There are no exact figures on how many persons have been arrested, or how many of those arrested are still alive, but the number us likely to be well over ten thousand persons. The Chilean generals themselves stated that by early October approximately 8,000 persons had been arrested. But most independent journalists of the world press estimate that there are (or were) over 7,000 prisoners in a single prison camp (in the National Stadium) in Santiago alone. But the National Stadium is only one of over a dozen camps in Santiago where political prisoners are being held. Virtually every barrack, air base, police station, jail and even a second stadium (the Chili Stadium) is crammed with prisoners. Report of murder and torture have come out of most of these camps.

In addition to these, large numbers of political prisoner have been herded into jails, police stations, military barracks, and air bases throughout the country. Literally every town, city and region in Chili has seen the mass arrest of political prisoners, all those who prominently supported the Popular Unity government. There have been reports of hundreds of prisoners held on naval ships in Valparaiso harbor. The
Chilean generals themselves admit that "detention camps" (concentration camps) have been established on Dawson Island and other islands in the storm lashed, isolated Cape Horn area. At least 500 and possibly thousands of the top leaders of the Popular Unity government and its supporting organizations have been shipped to these concentration camps. It is not certain how many of these prisoners have arrived alive or have survived "interrogation" since their arrival.

These are large prison camps for political prisoners in the city of Concepcion, others on an island near Concepcion where over 350 persons were taken on the first day of the putsch.

On the day of the putsch troops arrested the leadership of all Popular Unity organizations in the agrarian center of Talca, 150 miles north of Santiago. The Governor of the region attempted to organize resistance to the putsch but was captured and later executed. "About 100 other leftists, including the Mayor, the heads of the local Communist and Socialist parties and labor and peasant leaders are also being held, most of them without charges." (New York Times, September 24, 1973) The former Mayor of Talca and unspecified numbers of other leaders have since been executed. New arrests have continued, and in Temuco, 400 miles south of Santiago the former Governor is under arrest and held incommunicado. "About three hundred Marxists are in Temuco's jails waiting to be tried by military tribunals." (New York Times, October 6, 1973)

In Arica, in the far north, at least 150 persons were arrested in a single day. These fragmentary accounts suggest that in the month after the putsch thousands of persons are being held in jails, barracks and concentration camps outside of Santiago.

Who Are the Political Prisoners

Predictably, the Chilean generals and their supporters say that there are no political prisoners in their concentration camps and jails, only "criminals". What are the crimes for which the prisoners have been arrested?

The Chilean Junta and their supporters have tried to propagate the belief that the thousands and tens of thousands of prisoners arrested (and often murdered) are a lunatic fringe of terrorists, or alternately "extremists" or "Marxists" or at least opponents of capitalism (all these terms are about the same in the eyes of the Chilean fascists). The facts are that the political prisoners in the hands of the Chilean Junta comprise the
leadership and the rank and file supporters of much of Chilean society; certainly supporters of what was decent in Chilean society.

With the exception of those persons who have been able to go into hiding or who have escaped to foreign embassies, the political prisoners include all of the elected members of Congress who belonged to the six parties which made up the Popular Unity government (44% of the members of the Chilean parliament). The political prisoners include all of the state governors, mayors, and aldermen who belonged to the Popular Unity parties (over 50% of the elected local and regional officials). The political prisoners include all of the leadership of the six Popular Unity parties, from top to bottom. The political prisoners include all those persons in the various executive branches of government, regardless of political affiliation, who tried to loyally implement the programs of the Popular Unity government. They include the management of most of the state-owned or state-run utilities and companies, the directors and much of the staff of government planning agencies, the managers and staff of the National Health and Welfare agencies, and so forth. In short, the entire government staff at virtually all levels has been arrested or is in hiding. The political prisoners include the leaders of most labor unions, peasant organizations, cooperative federations, citizens groups, and of teachers, nurses or other professional groups who had supported the Popular Unity government. The political prisoners include thousands of persons who came to Chile as students or technicians to work for the Popular Unity government. Refugees from other military dictatorships in Latin America are feeling the brunt of the mass executions by the Chilean fascists. But above all, the political prisoners in Chile today include thousands of ordinary Chilean workers who saw and strongly supported the Popular Unity government as their only hope for a better society. As the Chilean fascists see it, these hopes have to be rooted out.

The majority of the prisoners have been arrested without any charge. Were the Chilean fascists have bothered to state charges against their prisoners, the "crimes" have been officially labeled as "treason", "subversion", or resistance to decrees of the Junta.

The scale and scope of the mass arrests by the Chilean generals and their fascist supporters is difficult to convey. The entire social, political, and administrative fabric has been torn to shreds. The scale of the repression will become somewhat clearer in the following sections.
"Official" Executions

Many of those who were captured while actually preparing or offering armed resistance to the putsch were executed before they reached prisons. The charges against political prisoners then, when any are laid, usually mean that the prisoner in some way aided the program of the democratically elected and constitutionally operated Popular Unity government. The charges mean no more or no less. Nothing more, however, is required in Chile today in order to be arrested, beaten or murdered. Most of these charges carry the death penalty when tried before the military kangaroo "courts" now operating. However, most of the prisoners who have been executed and murdered have not even been given the sham of a military trial.

In the first five weeks of the fascist terror, the Chilean Junta has reported "only" 77 official executions of prisoners. In these cases the prisoners have survived long enough to be tried by a secret military tribunal on secret charges (generally) reported as "treason" or subversion) and are then shot. These military tribunals have condemned virtually all of the prisoners who have come before them so far to death. Those executed through the agency of the military tribunals are only a small fraction of the total number of persons being murdered. Names of those "officially" executed gives some indication of the ferocity of the terror.

The democratically elected Popular Unity governor of Talca province was executed on September 27. A few days later the Junta announced the execution of the mayor of Talca. More than 30 persons were "tried" before military tribunals in Valparaiso alone. (New York Times, September 27, 1973)

The Ley de Fuga" (shooting prisoners who are supposed to be escaping) is being openly practiced and reported by the Junta. Five prisoners, already in custody, were reported shot while trying to escape on October 5th. Similar accounts have appeared almost daily during the weeks since the putsch.

The military authorities announced today that four "extremists" were shot to death in Linares, 150 miles south of here, on Tuesday and that a fifth man was killed by soldiers yesterday in the northern city of Arica.

The four killed in Linares wee said to have tried to escape while reconstructing the attack on a police post they wee accused of having
made. They were identified as Leopoldo Gonzales Norambuena, 20, Segundo Sandoval Gomez, 19, Jose Sepulveda Baeza, 22, and Teofilo Arce Tolosa, 26.

The man killed in Arica, identified as Luis Rojas Valenduel, had been denounced for having arms in his home. The authorities said he was killed when a military patrol arrived and he tried to seize one of the soldier's machine guns.

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A delegation from the Socialist International this week as the Chilean Foreign Ministry for information about 21 prominent figures in the former Allende administration, who are now missing. The military authorities have not responded.

New York Times, October 7, 1973

On a day which has become fairly typical under the Chilean fascist regime, 18 prisoners were reported as executed. (These are in addition to the more numerous clandestine murders of political prisoners.)

In the southern city of Valdivia 11 persons described as Marxist guerillas were shot by a firing squad Thursday night after having been convicted by a military court for terrorist activity (i.e. armed resistance to the coup).

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In a regimental barracks at Temuco in the south, Pedro Rios Castille, former vice president of the Provincial Development Board, and Guido Tronsco Peres, a member of President Allende's presidential guard, were shot and killed when they allegedly tried to seize arms from their guards.

In the same town, at the Magvehue air base, Hernan Henriques Aravena, chief of the regional National Health Service, and Alepandro Flores (an aide) were reported shot dead while trying to escape.

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In the northern city of Arica, it was confirmed that a military patrol shot and killed the union leader Luis Rojas Vahensuela, when he allegedly tried to resist arrest.

New York Times, October 7, 1973

In addition, a man was shot by police in the city of Concepcion for violating the curfew, two men were killed in the southernmost province of Aisen allegedly for resisting and attacking the police, which 32 new prisoners were taken in Santiago and 12 in the city of Talca while attending a clandestine meeting.
All this is merely the publicity reported repression, in a single day, three weeks after the putsch.

On October 23, the Junta reported that 19 persons faced military tribunal on charges of "subversion".

The army said that the latest executions were in the region of the city of Concepcion, south of here. Those put to death, said to be members of the Communist party, included Danilo Gonzales Mardones, former Mayor of the coal-mining town of Lotz, and Isidero Carillo Torneria, former general manager of the National Coal Company.

New York Times, October 24, 1973

Many opponents of the putsch who were taken prisoner never reached the jails alive. We will never know how many. However, it is clear that the notorious "Ley de Fuga" was and is being applied, whereby the police or other guards shoot the prisoners in custody and report they were killed while trying to escape. Cases of this type of murder occurred from the first hours of the putsch and continue today.

Individual and mass murder of political prisoners has been carried out by the army and police in the National Stadium and in other military and civilian prisons. The descriptions of ongoing torture and mass murder of prisoners are too numerous, too widely reported, and eye witnessed by too many persons of diverse background and views to be denied.

Mass Murder and Torture of Popular Unity Supporters

The evidence of the systematic campaign to physically exterminate the entire leadership of the Popular Unity movement, from top leaders to rank and file, is overwhelming. Estimates of the number murdered by the Chilean generals and their supporters range from 2,000 persons to over 10,000 persons in the first weeks after the putsch alone. Most accounts suggest that more 2,000 persons have been killed in Santiago alone. Whatever the final toll, it will be staggering. Mass murders of Popular Unity supporters are taking place in and outside of prison literally every day.

We will probably never know how many thousands of Chileans and other Latin Americans residing in Chile have been murdered by the Junta. It is only now, more than eight years after a similar genocidal campaign by the Guatemalan army (directed by the C.I.A.) that we know that the bodies of thousands of murdered Guatemalans were hidden in mass
graves or dropped in the sea by helicopter. There are indications that the Chilean Junta is following similar procedures in at least some cases. After all, they have the same teachers as the Guatemalan army and police.

Many of the persons taken prisoner in Chile have never been officially charged and their names appear on no detention papers. There is no official, traceable record of them. This is particularly true of thousands of Latin American exiles who had fled from military dictatorships in their own countries. The bodies of many have already tuned up in morgues or have been found in the Mapocho River, after having been arrested. Many political prisoners will probably just disappear. Reports of this have already streamed in from many independent journalists.

The accounts and eyewitness reports of massive, systematic and ongoing mass murder and of the most bestial tortures do not bear summarizing. A few of the many such accounts follow. They give an indication of the forces in Chile to which the Canadian government, in our names, has extended friendly relations. Chile today shows the face of fascism in its most bloody and savage aspect.

Consider the account of a Swedish economist, Claes Croner, working under U.N. auspices in the Institute of Economy and Economic Planning in the University of Chile, who was arrested on the first day of the putsch and taken to the National Stadium.

In the cell were the former director of the Agrarian Economy Institute, Indap (Adrian Vasques), the vice president of the government Development Corporation, Corfo (Dario Paez), the editor-in-chief of the Santiago newspaper Punto Final (Manuel Cabieses) and a number of representatives of the Chilean Association of Journalists.

A local political leader had said something disparaging about the soldiers in their presence. His face had disappeared, two ribs were broken. ... He had been saved moments before being executed through his personal friendship with one of the local army officers.

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Especially on the third night in the Stadium we could hear the executions from our cell. Each began with terrible cries and glows, along with this were footsteps and gasps as if someone were being dragged. Shortly after there would be shots in the lower sections of the Stadium, ten to twenty shots. ... These shots were heard day and night.

Der Spiegel, October 1, 1973
Another account is by a Swedish technical expert, Henrik Janbell, who had been employed in the Institute of Wood Technology. He was held eleven days in the smaller Chile Stadium prison camp.

*During my interrogation, I and other prisoners with me were beaten by blows from rifle butts and kicks against out knees, ribs and genitals.*

An especially developed torture was having to lie on the concrete floor for up to 40 hours. The soldiers wheeled wheelbarrows filled with paving stones over the prisoners.

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*An Argentinian who lay beside me in the cell was taken for interrogation. An hour later he was brought back covered in blood--his face was a single open wound. He was hardly back in the cell when they took him out again. Shortly after we heard shots. He never came back.*

Der Spiegel, October 1, 1973

There are a large number of separate accounts of torture and mass executions of political prisoners held in the National Stadium. A Reuter News Agency report quotes an account of one eyewitness to one such execution which took place in the National Stadium on September 14th.

"They first took out 30 people from underneath the presidential stand. They put them into a line like athletes, then they mounted two machine guns.

The commandants...asked me to point out who of those lined up were Socialists so they could be shot.

I told them there were no Socialists among the 30. Then he ordered them all to run down the field. Half of them ran. The machine guns cut them to pieces.

Those that did not run they shot in the head and the stomach," he said.

Toronto Star, October 2, 1973

Another account:

*A U.S. couple held prisoner for a week in Chile said in Miami yesterday they had seen the execution of 400 to 500 people.*

*Patricia and Adam Garrett Scheech also accused Chile's new military leaders of "conducting a program against foreigners."

*The Scheechs, graduate students at the University of Wisconsin, were released on Friday and expelled from Chile. They arrived in Miami aboard one of the first flights permitted to leave Santiago.*
"We personally saw the shooting of 400 to 500 prisoners, in groups of 30 to 40, at the National Stadium where were being held," said Mr. Scheech, 31. He said the shootings were carried out by the military.

Globe and Mail, September 24

During the last week in September a Newsweek reporter was able to sneak into the Santiago city morgue. He found the bodies of 150 persons, on the main floor.

Upstairs I passed through a swing door and there in a dimly lit corridor lay at least 50 more bodies, squeezed one against another, their heads propped up against the wall. They were all naked.

Most had been shot at close range, under the chin. Some had been machine gunned in the body. Their chests had been split open and sewn together grotesquely in what presumably had been a pro forma autopsy. There were all young, and judging from the roughness of their hands, all from the working class. A couple of them were girls, distinguishable among the massed bodies only by the curves of their breasts. Most of their heads had been crushed.

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The next day I returned with a Chilean friend so that I would have a witness. ... There were more bodies, perhaps 70, and they were different from the day before.

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Workers at the morgue have been warned that they will be court martialed and shot if they reveal what is going on there. But I was able to obtain an official morgue body count from the daughter of a member of its staff: by the fourteenth day following the coup, she said, the morgue had received and processed 2,796 corpses.

No one knows how many have been disposed of elsewhere; a gravedigger told me of reports that helicopters have been gathering bodies at the emergency first aid center in central Santiago, then carrying them out to sea to be dumped.

Newsweek, October 8, 1973

A reporter for the German weekly Der Spiegel provides another set of accounts of the terror mounted by the Chilean fascists during the last weeks in September.

At night when the streets are emptied by the military curfew, the military 'purification' squads begin to move. In the morning, passersby discover large pools of blood on the sidewalks or bodies covered in newspapers, in the main business streets. Inhabitants of the slums
(working class areas) near the Pudahuel airport alone fished the bodies of 45 murdered persons out of the Mapocho River. And in the center of Santiago, many bodies were washed up against various bridges which cross the Mapocho River.

Der Spiegel, October 1, 1973

Additional accounts of secret executions and torture of political prisoners come from virtually all journalists on the spot.

The bodies of seven men, some showing signs of beating as well as bullet wounds, were found by the Mapocho River near the Bulnes bridge on September 24 according to church sources here. The seven were reported to be among 20 workers picked up during a raid on the slum district called Nueva Matacuane in the Santiago suburbs.

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There have been innumerable reports and rumors of persons arrested during raid and then found "executed", often by the Mapocho River, but until now people have been reticent about giving names for fear of reprisal.

A Brazilian, who cannot be identified, was found recently by the river with two bullet wounds. He told church sources that he and other Brazilians had been arrested on September 13 during a raid on their apartment. The next day, he said, he was taken with an Argentine, a Chilean and two Brazilians to the Mapocho River. His companions were shot dead.

New York Times, October 6, 1973

There are accounts from the Santiago working class areas (poblaciones) where many political prisoners were taken and then murdered.

Presumably, the junta believes that since the poblaciones provided the former government's main support, they must be terrorized into accepting the fact of its demise. So the local leaders are not paying with their lives for their love of Allende. Not one poblacion has escaped the terror.

In the poblacion of Pincoya, one woman told how she became a widow.

"Soldiers raided out poblacion last Saturday at 8 in the morning. In the section where we live, they rounded up about 50 men and held them until a police lieutenant came to take his pick. When the lieutenant saw my husband, he made him step forward and told him 'Now you will pay for all you people have done.' The carabineros took him and a few others to the police station, and the rest were arrested by soldiers." For three
days, she and other women of Pincoya searched for their men in police stations and the two soccer stadiums where thousands are incarcerated. It was only after they heard that a 17-year-old boy from their block had been found in the morgue--shot in the head and chest--that they made the journey to see the lists of the dead. There they found her husband, Gabriel, as well as every adult male from the block of their poblacion.

Newsweek, October 8, 1973

The same reporter attended a funeral in the poblacion of Santa Marie. The bodies of three youths who had been arrested and who were later found in the city morgue were being buried by their families.

One of the boys was so riddled with bullets that they could hardly dress him for burial. But the fate of the other two was worse. Coffins in Chile have small window doors over the face of the dead, and the women opened them for me. There were no heads inside.

Newsweek, October 8, 1973

The feared "death squads" of Brazil, members of the police and army who carry out "executions" on their own of persons they suspect or claim to be "criminals" and dissidents, have now come to Chile.

More than 2,000 people may have been killed in the month since a military coup toppled the Marxist coalition government in Chile.

This conclusion was reached after extensive questioning in the slums of Santiago and in several cities and towns south of the capital.

Perhaps most of the fatalities were unreported executions carried out after the first heavy armed resistance to the military ceased after three days.

Dozens of witnesses report that there were many senseless killings and much unwarranted brutality in the arrests of suspected leftists.

It also appears that security forces have used the coup to execute summarily many petty criminals as well as suspected opponents of the regime.

The death figures may also rise considerably when the fate of several thousand people now listed as prisoners is known.

Globe and Mail, October 12, 1973

Most simply, this is an open reign of terror by the fascist supporters operating in conjunction with the army and police.

In the adjoining poblacion (settlement), named after the late Chilean poet, Pablo Neruda, residents confirmed that three people had been killed by the soldiers.

Two of the victims, named Arredondo and Molina, were taken away
and executed. Their bodies were recovered in the city morgue. A third man was executed in front of his home.

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In the Nogales poblacion, for example, one man was executed in his home and found by his brother. Another man in the same poblacion--said by residents to be a mugger--was hot dead by soldiers, who then executed two of his brothers.
"They said the bad blood ran in the family," a neighbor explained bitterly.

In the adjoining poblacion called Santiago, a woman was shot to death by security forces when she stepped out on her patio after the 10 p.m. curfew and threw out dirty water.

Four people, whom residents in the poblacion said were strangers, were released from the back of an army truck, told to run, and then machine gunned to death.

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The Junta announced that in another Barrancas shany town, called Santiago Pino, five extremists had been summarily executed for shooting at soldiers. But all six residents of the shantytown who were interviewed insisted that the soldiers had not been shot at and pointedly noted that the five executed men were the political leaders of Santiago Pino.

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Residents of a poblacion near El Pedrero, a garbage dump in Santiago, reported that"30 to 50 bodies a day" were being buried there by soldiers. Two garbage men denied this, but added that 28 people had been executed at the dump since September 14 and disposed of elsewhere.

"Sometimes they shot up to four people in one day" one said.
"They were all muggers and thieves," the garbage man insisted. How did he know? "I could tell by looking at their faces."

New York Times, October 12, 1973

These squads of murderers have the backing of the Junta and the 'respectable' people who support it.

No one appears to be safe from the Junta assassins.

One case involved the Rev. Juan Alerina, a Spanish priest of the Catholic Action Movement who was arrested on September 18. The Archbishop was notified of the priest's arrest but could not contact him.
Several days later a body with 10 bullet holes in the back was found in the Mapocho River. A Spanish consul identified the body as that of Father Alcina.

New York Times, October 1, 1973

What happens to those who are not shot on the spot (in midnight raids on houses) or who are not quickly sentenced by secret military tribunals, is exemplified by the case of Luisa Gasmuri. Luisa, a minor functionary of the M.A.P.U party (left Catholic) and an employee at the 'Corfo' government planning office, survived only because after torture she was left for dead on the street and was later able to drag herself into hiding in a workers' quarter.

Crying softly, Luisa said, "They burned my breasts with red hot iron rods and tormented me where a woman is most sensitive with sharp instruments and bottles. A doctor whom I've been able to see gave me the worst news two days ago. I'll never be able to have children now."

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These are not isolated cases. In the Santiago morgue lie the corpses of hundreds of workers, many of them horribly disfigured.

Der Spiegel, October 8, 1973

Despite the tight censorship, fear and curfews, reports of mass murder and torture have now appeared in most of the world's press. Apart from expelling newsmen and making the reporting of executions and murder a treasonable offence, the Junta has entered upon a propaganda campaign of its own. This campaign involves playing down the ferocious and extensive nature of the repression and claiming that excesses were committed by as yet undetermined and unapprehended civilian groups.

With concern mounting here and abroad over alleged human rights violations by the ruling military junta, the commander of Chile's main detention camp has charged that vigilantes are executing released prisoners.

Col. Jorge Espinosa, commander of the improvised camp at the Santiago soccer stadium that houses 3,700 detainees, said that more than 50 persons released for lack of evidence against them have disappeared or turned up dead.

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Concern is fed by the military's own announcements of daily executions in scattered locales, said in each case to have been triggered
by armed attacks on the troops, or by attempted escape of prisoners--this despite apparent tranquility throughout the country, still under tight military control.

Toronto Star, October 15, 1973

The crocodile tears for legality shed by the commander of the largest concentration camp take on an even more grim hypocrisy when one realizes that Roberto Thieme, and other heads of the most bloody vigilante groups, were identified by surviving eye witnesses as directing many beatings and executions in the National Stadium. The leaders of the neo-fascist Fatherland and Liberty bands, who have publicly admitted to assassinations of leading Popular Unity officials before the putsch, have been released by the Junta and are now busy coordinating political support for it.

A frightening set of figures dealing with the prisoners in the National Stadium were inadvertently revealed by the Junta on October 4th.

A government spokesman said yesterday that 1,525 persons held in the National Stadium here after the military take over had been released, 118 men and seven women have been transferred to prisons for judicial proceedings to begin, and 607 prisoners were being interrogated for a second time.

There have been as many as 7,000 prisoners in the stadium at one time, according to official sources.

New York Times, October 6, 1973

This would indicate that many thousands of prisoners are unaccounted for in this single prison camp alone.

What has happened to political prisoners held in dozens of air bases, military camps and jails in other parts of the country one can only guess.

The attitude of large sectors of the Chilean middle class is predictable. The Junta, after all, is their real representative.

Because of the total censorship of domestic reporting, most middle and upper class Chileans have no idea of what is happening. They hear rumors, but their hatred for Allende compounded by their historic contempt for the "rotos" leaves them little desire to verify them. Many do not believe the stories about slaughter in the poblaciones; many simply don't much care. "Why should we?" a Chilean lawyer asked me over an expensive lunch in a wealthy section of Santiago. "I don't believe the stories you tell me, but after the things the supporters of Salvador Allende have done to Chile, they deserve whatever happens to them."

Newsweek, October 8, 1973
We will undoubtedly be hearing from similar "respectable" Chileans when they tour the country or consult with Canadian government officials in the future.

**Campaign of Fear and Denunciation**

Even the Chilean generals and fascists cannot imprison or kill the 1.3 million Chileans who supported the Popular Unity government. They and other ordinary people in Chile who oppose fascism comprise over half of the population. The Junta's strategy is to strike fear and terror into the hearts of all Chileans who might oppose them. The strategy is to set ordinary Chileans against each other and to create a paralysis of fear.

Some of the most widespread examples of the campaign of fear and denunciation being carried out by the Junta and its supporters are:

1. the repeated proclamations read over radio and television stations that anyone found with arms or anyone resisting the armed forces in any way will be shot on the spot;
2. the policy of unchecked, open murder and the deposition of mutilated bodies in public places;
3. the daily and even hourly messages on radio, television and by leaflets urging Chileans to root out the foreign exiles who live in Chile;
4. the never ending proclamations, edicts, messages from the Junta and the entire (and willing) mass media urging Chileans to denounce anyone they suspect as supporters of the Popular Unity government.

In Santiago,

... *Last week the Junta stepped up its campaign against Marxism into a virtual holy war aimed at destroying anyone and anything vaguely connected with Allende. Thousands of people were jailed without hearings. Soldiers beat people and burned books. Ten people were shot by firing squads after summary courts-martial for hostile acts against the new government. Manhunts are still being conducted for some of Allende’s major political collaborators, and longhaired youths were still being subjected to instant haircuts.*

*Time, October 8, 1973*

In southern Chile,

*One foreign girl who teaches in the southern town of Temuco got off the bus yesterday in Santiago with a hair-raising story. Hundreds of people have been arrested, she said, accused of nothing more than*
cooperation with the Allende government. Lists of local people wanted by the army are read over the radio, and Edict No. 30 of the Temuco local government, she said, states that "for every innocent dead, 10 detainees will be killed."

Toronto Star, September 10, 1973

The Government announced that it was offering $14,000 for information leading to the arrest of any of the 13 most wanted Marxists. It also said that informers would be allowed to keep any money found on the fugitives.

The most wanted men include Carlos Altamirano, the Socialist Party chairman, and Miguel Enriques, leader of the Revolutionary Left Movement.

The martial law in effect since the coup will apparently be used to enforce a campaign against common criminals as well as leftists.

The new director of the Ministry of the Interior's Investigations Department, Gen. Ernesto Baeza, has announced a "war to the death" against criminals.

New York Times, September 23, 1973

"Criminals", of course, are anyone whom the military, fascists and other vigilante groups wish to do away with.

The psychological campaign, conducted with the wholehearted support of a servile press, meets the very goals of the military men who pretend to "mollify social hate" because it encourages "revenge-seekers", incited denunciations, and creates an atmosphere of terror.

Le Monde (English edition), September 28, 1973

Three weeks after the bloody coup that brought it to power, Chile's military junta is imposing an iron rule on the country, burning Marxist books, purging suspected supporters of former President Allende from government jobs and pitting Chilean against Chilean by encouraging citizens to turn in suspected dissidents.

Radio broadcasts, in fact, call on all citizens to denounce whatever "extremist activities" they encounter. And this, observers believe, is the most dangerous part of the campaign. By licensing anyone to turn in a neighbor, the military is perhaps setting the climate for a cruel and cold civil war. Personal vendettas and rancors can from now on easily be translated into "extremist activities", and anyone's personal enemy can end up in the hands of the police.

Toronto Star, October 4, 1973
The police and army, aided by gangs of right wing civilian groups, proceed to destroy all the outward symbols of the history and loyalty which brought the Popular Unity government to power. The names of buildings and sections of the city which honored popular leaders and groups are changed. Murals, which covered walls everywhere, and which depicted the history of the sacrifices and struggle of the Chilean nation and Chilean working class, have been scrubbed off or painted over, under the guns of police patrols. Statues of popular heroes are torn down--and so on. This is all basically done to drive home the point unmistakably--'the old bosses are back, and the people had better remember it.'

The campaign of intimidation and denunciation is furthered by the repeated searches of whole sections of the city. Some working class districts have already been swept two and three times. The point of these searches is not only to locate the remaining leaders of the Popular Unity movement or to break up the underground resistance which is now developing. These searches are also a primary vehicle to intimidate the population. During a search, no man or woman can be sure that he or she will not be beaten, arrested, or worse. The uncertainty is part of the campaign of terror.

Tens of thousands of persons, possibly hundreds of thousands, have been subjected to personal search under the guns of the police and military. It is impossible to offer the slightest resistance during search. The extreme destructiveness, provocation and threats accompanying these searches (at least in the working class areas) are part of the technique to inculcate a pattern of submission on the part of the Chilean people.

The Junta Minister of the Interior decided to inspect "the conditions of the poor" in the Santiago shanty town of Hi Chi Minh (later renamed Cabo de Carbineros, or 'Military Police Headquarters') eight days after the putsch.

General Bonilla strode across the dusty, unpaved main street, approached a women in the first house of the shantytown, and asked her what her most serious concern was.

"We are scared by the rumors that we are going to be bombed by the military," Mrs. Nilda Gonzales answered unhesitatingly. "The police told us we would be bombed."

New York Times, September 23, 1973

Probably, it is impossible for most of us to fully comprehend the psychological power of the repression being unleashed upon the Chilean
working class. They are entitled to more than our sympathy and moral solidarity.

... By now, inhabitants of the poblaciones are utterly terrified. "I am too afraid to look for him," says a woman from the Ultima Hora poblacion, whose husband was last seen covered with blood being hauled away in a police truck. "I am afraid that they will take me, too, and what would happen then to my four children?" Many now are afraid even to associate with families that had any connection with Allende’s regime--whether as party members, union leaders or employees in the food distribution centers. "They can kill whomever they want to kill", says Contreras bitterly. "There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that we can do about it."

Newsweek, October 8, 1973

Still, an underground resistance organization seems to be pulling itself together.

Political Parties Outlawed and Elected Representatives Removed

On September 20, 1973 the Chilean Junta outlawed all 'Marxist' parties--the six parties of the Popular Unity government--and officially closed the National Congress, provincial governments, and all local governments. The elected representatives of the Popular Unity parties had already been arrested or were in hiding.

The parties outlawed include the Socialist Party of Chile, the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Radical Party (left liberal), the M.A.P.U. (left Catholic) and the Independents. The national, regional and local offices, presses, finances, and other social, educational, and welfare facilities of these parties have either been seized by the Junta or destroyed. These parties obtained the support of 44% of the electorate in the last national election, and 51% of the vote in the last provincial and local elections. This is a higher percentage of the total vote than obtained by most Canadian government during more than 50 years.

The elected representatives of the above parties of the Popular Unity government have either been arrested, are in hiding, or have been murdered. At least two known elected representatives have been publicly executed by the Junta, in addition to the murder of President Allende.

For the first weeks after the putsch, the traditional right wing parties (now including the Christian Democrats) supported the Junta, hoping and
expecting that the military would soon call them to govern. In the interval, it has become apparent that the traditional right wing parties have been replaced by neo-Fascist (Gremios) civilian groups as the source of civilian support. The Junta plans to write a new constitution giving itself representation and veto power in all-important facets of Chilean life. Furthermore, it is attempting to develop an open and durable class dictatorship of the most reactionary elements of the ruling and middle class, without resort to any parliamentary facade.

SANTIAGO, Chile, September 21--The new military junta said today that it had banned Marxist political parties and would soon announce a new constitution giving the armed forces a role in future legislative bodies. Gen. Gustavo Leigh Guzman, also a member of the military junta, disclosed that a new constitution would soon be put into effect.

"There is a committee of distinguished jurists working on a new constitution for Chile, based on a general outline indicated by the junta," said General Leigh.

According to the general, the armed forces want the new constitution to broaden their role in the country and to assure them "representation in legislative bodies."

New York Times, September 22, 1973

The reunited Christian Democrats greeted the coup with jubilation. They issued a Junta-approved statement deploring the violence but offering support for Chile's new leaders. The party statement went on to note that the Christian Democrats were certain that power would be returned "to the sovereign people" as soon as "the burdensome tasks of the junta have been completed."

Time, September 24, 1973

The new regime is doubtless pleased at the backing it has received from Cardinal Raul Silva Enriquez, but in present circumstances Church support is of limited value. Even less useful is the predictable line-up of the Christian Democratic leadership, under Aylwin and ex-President Eduardo Frei, behind the military. ... The telephone call by Frei to a relative in Europe, reported by The Guardian of Manchester last week, forecasting elections within 6-12 months, will merely serve to convince the left that from the first he has been cast in the willing role of the Balaguer of Chile.

Latin America (London), September 21, 1973

However, this congratulations and jubilation on the part of the "democratic right" (putsch in liberty) was somewhat premature.
SANTIAGO--There is no prospect of an early return of political parties in Chile, a member of the military junta has declared.

The declaration comes as traditionally conservative sectors of Chilean society are showing signs of concern about the direction the new military junta is travelling.

The first signs of concern emerged in an interview with one member of the junta, Gen. Gustav Leigh, by the editor of the right-wing Tribuna. 'NO TIME FOR FORUMS'

"It is not a moment for discussion, dialogue, assembly, forums or parliamentary sessions," he said. Only after cleaning up the country will the junta study the possibility of authorizing the legal existence of political parties.

Toronto Star, October 10, 1973

In interviews and public statements, the armed forces have made it clear that they place a major share of the blame for the country's state of affairs on political parties as a whole.

Congress has been dissolved since the first day of the coup, and this week the junta imposed "an indefinite recess" on anti-Marxist parties as well.

Even mayors and aldermen are being replaced throughout the country by government appointees.

POLITICIANS SILENT

The major non-Marxist politicians such as former President Eduardo Frei Montalva have chosen to remain silent. Those who do speak out are silenced. A leading moderate politician who severely criticized the coup publicly was warned by military officials that they would not tolerate such incidents.

The only institution that has not been touched by the junta is the court system, although detained leftists are dealt with through military tribunals. But again, the highest courts have openly expressed their support of the armed forces, and stopped just short of applauding the coup.

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According to General Leigh, the most articulate and colorful of the junta members, the new constitution will be promulgated by decree and will assure that the military has "representation in legislative bodies."
New York Times, September 28, 1973

All the parties in the Popular Unity coalition have been banned, trade unions driven underground, and the press muzzled. The junta members have reiterated their determination to bestow a new constitution on Chile, consulting only themselves and a few carefully selected advisers to round off the details.

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The spokesman of the Christian Democrats politely reminds the armed forces of their undertaking to "give power back to the people." He gives them "a reasonable time" and even proposes to put his party's "technicians" at the junta's disposal to speed up the task of "national reconstruction."

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Is it possible that he and the other advocates of "democratic socialism" have all been duped? The Brazilian, Argentinian, Uruguayan, and Bolivian armed forces--not to mention others--all provide examples which are ample food for thought. And the Chilean military men, even in their first hesitant moves as government leaders, are already beginning to show that they are not much different from their Latin American counterparts.

The similarity is quite extraordinary, and every statement made by the members of the junta leaves one with the impression it has all been heard before. Like other junta, the Chilean leaders deny they want power.

Reprint from Le Monde in the Globe and Mail, October 2, 1973

National, State and Local Governments Closed Down

In addition to outlawing the Popular Unity parties and arresting their leaders, the Junta has dissolved all elected governments in Chile. They closed the National Congress (Parliament) on the first day of the putsch and shortly after dispersed all twenty-five provincial governments as well as local governments. They have even replaced all mayors and aldermen of towns with military commanders.

Even the right-wing Nationalist and official Christian Democrat parties, which had hailed the putsch, were "recessed" (although not outlawed). Their elected representatives have been dismissed from national, state
and local governments. The Junta is proceeding to rule by decree through military officers in conjunction with supporters from the most reactionary business circles in Chile. The vision of the Junta is clearly that of a corporate state. The Junta has a distaste for even the trappings of a parliamentary democracy, much to the chagrin of the traditional right-wing politicians who believed they would be asked to run the country with the armed forces supplying the required repression. The Junta instead has proceeded to operate by fiat. An example from Temuco, an agrarian town and provincial capital of Cautin, a province characterized by large landholders and landless peasants:

"The politicians are through," said Col. Herman Ramires, the new military governor of Cautin. "I am the only person who gives orders around here now. And when I need advice I turn to the people who are best qualified to give it."

"His office is the same one occupied by the former leftist governor, who is now being held incommunicado and under house arrest. It is crowded with leaders of the merchant, farmer and professional associations.

"It is obvious that you need a businessman to solve business problems, and a farmer to solve farm problems," noted the colonel. "So when I came, I swept the Marxists out and I said, "You, you and you set this mess straight."

New York Times, October 6, 1973

The 'Marxists', of course, were the democratically, constitutionally elected provincial and city governments.

An example of the local civilian leaders and organizations chosen to advise and carry out the 'policies' of the Junta is the 'farmer' referred to by Col. Ramirez. Michael Fusslocher, a wealthy "middle-sized" farmer who led the local campaign against land reform, is now in charge of farm production and land holdings in Temuco. (New York Times, October 19, 1973)

On October 11th, the Junta extended its ban on all progressive organizations through a blanket ban of any organizations which are similar to 'Marxist' parties, organizations which have 'substantial' points in common with 'Marxism', organizations which support aims similar to the Popular Unity government. Obviously this decree can and will be used to repress any organization opposing the Junta (and their political front men who will appear later).

The same Junta proclamation made it a crime to spread the aims of the
outlawed political groups by word of mouth, in writing, or in any other way. Such "intellectual subversion" is to be a crime punishable by long-term imprisonment or even death.

All citizens groups and organizations which supported or cooperated in the Popular Unity government's social programs have been banned. New "greminal" (associations which support the Junta) are being recognized in the poblaciones.

In many cases, the direct beneficiaries of this local political power vacuum have been members of the Christian Democratic party--the only non-Marxist group with a strong following in the poblaciones.

For example, in the Pincoya Poblacion on the northern outskirts of Santiago, political leadership of some 1,500 families has largely fallen on the shoulders of three or four Christian Democratic women.

"The soldiers have done what had to be done," said Mrs. Margarita Gallejo, now the Secretary of the local neighborhood council.

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Three like-minded women are being considered by military authorities for the leading community posts in the Pablo Neruda Poblacion adjoining Pincoya.

New York Times, October 17, 1973

Junta Supporters in Chile

SANTIAGO (Reuter)--Chile's military authorities yesterday released leaders of a neo-Fascist movement jailed under the former government of Marxist President Salvador Allende for allegedly staging an unprecedented wave of violence.

Roberto Thieme, the 30-year-old Secretary General of the Fatherland and Freedom movement, and four of his top aides, were freed on bail by a magistrate's order endorsed by the Supreme Court.

Globe and Mail, September 27, 1973

Meanwhile the leader of the right-wing Fatherland and Liberty movement, which had acted openly to overthrow the Allende regime, declared his full support of the junta.

Pablo Rodrigues Grez, who helped lead an unsuccessful uprising against President Allende on June 29, held a news conference here today
to explain the role of Fatherland and Liberty in the events leading up to
the military take over two weeks ago.

New York Times, September 28, 1973
Both Thieme and Grez have publicly admitted to and boasted about
their roles in assassinating leaders of the Popular Unity government
before the putsch and carrying out the right terrorist campaign. They are
now busy organizing the infrastructure of a "new social movement"
throughout the country to support the Junta.
And the material for this "new social movement"?

Juan Salas, president of the Chilean Truckers Confederation (truck
owners), asked the nation's truckers to return to work tomorrow,
ending a strike that had disrupted the national economy for more than
six weeks. Some 40,000 truckers, most of them owners of their vehicles,
had demanded higher fees and a promise from Dr. Allende not to
nationalize their industry.

Mr. Salas, speaking on the official radio network, congratulated the
truckers for maintaining the strike.
"The effort that all of you made has been crowned with the
satisfaction of seeing the fatherland free," he said.

Another trucking industry leader, Leon Vilarin, congratulated the
armed forces for ending their tradition of political neutrality and
staging the nation's first military coup in 42 years.

Organizations representing doctors, dentists, pharmacists, nurses
and other professionals said that their groups were ready to return to
work immediately.

New York Times, September 13, 1973
The civilian groups that appear to have the strongest influence on
the military government are the middle class associations--the truck
owners, shopkeepers, businessmen, and professional employees--who
vehemently opposed President Allende and now meet on a daily basis
with military ministers.

In the last two days, for instance, vendors' street stands during
President Allende's administration were rapidly being shut down.
Military leaders said their removal was part of a campaign to clean up
the city and smooth traffic flow. But established storeowners--who are
members of the powerful National Federation of Retailers--were known
to be unhappy over the competition provided by the unlicensed vendors.

New York Times, September 26, 1973
SANTIAGO--Truckers, shopkeepers, doctors and other middle class groups who played a major role in the overthrow of Socialist President Salvador Allende are emerging as a significant force in the political vacuum of Chile.

By the same token, the military authorities have given increasing recognition to the Gremios, or business, farm and professional associations, as the authentic representatives of the people.

Gen. Augusto Pinochet, president of the Junta, has gone so far as to say that the new constitution, currently being drafted, will give priority to these associations as the means for the responsible participation of citizens in the live of the country.

"Gremios have a dual role: to build a very strong social movement to curb the excesses of political power and to exercise a consultative, technical function," Mr. Guzman said.

Mr. Guzman's (an important coordinator of Greminal support) views are clearly reflected in a number of pronouncements by the military leaders. He has admitted to friends that he participated in drafting some of the first military decrees published after the coup, including one that declared the illegitimacy of the Allende government.

Gremialism, as expounded by Mr. Guzman, appears to be a combination of traditional liberal capitalism and an Iberian-type corporatism.

Like the corporate structure in Spain, Chilean Gremialism is the association of people of the same professions, defending common interests, with emphasis on the technocratic elite.

Mr. Guzman's contacts with the Gremio leaders are apparently close but informal. There is coordination among the various Gremios but no single formal structure.

The Gremios have shown their allegiance to the military junta in different ways. The first declaration of whole-hearted support of the military take over of September 11 came from the Gremios.

Since then, they have made important financial contributions to the military's "program of national reconstruction". Several Gremio leaders have embarked on tours of the United States, Canada and Europe to explain the reasons for the overthrow of the Allende government. They
have also acted as lobbies here among foreign journalists, fervently justifying the military take over.

The junta, in return, has not only made numerous declarations stressing the participating of Gremios but also has sought Gremio leaders as advisors. Among these is economist Orlando Saens, president of the manufacturers association.

"The Gremios played a decisive role in the fight for freedom and law; now a fundamental role will fall to them in the process of the renaissance of a new Chilean fatherland," says Jorge Fontaine, president of the powerful Confederation of Production and Commerce, which includes the National Farm Bureau and the Chambers of Commerce.

Globe and Mail, October 23, 1973

It can't be much clearer. This is the Chilean road to a Fascist society.

**Nationalized Foreign Holdings Returned**

One of the key rationales for the U.S. economic blockade of Chile and the more bloody covert intervention which followed was the Popular Unity government's move to nationalize sixteen major "multinational" (U.S.) corporations. The best known and most central of these were the three copper mining companies and the International Telephone and Telegraph. These companies virtually owned the major export resources of Chile (80% of foreign earning from copper), were taking staggering profits (over 50% per year), were evading Chilean laws and taxes, and, especially in the case of I.T.T., were deeply involved in illegal political activities to control the Chilean government. It has to be noted that all Chilean parties, the Popular Unity parties, the Christian Democrats and even the right wing Nationalists, voted for the law to nationalize these foreign holdings in 1970.

Since the putsch, the Chilean generals and their supporters have effectively denationalized all Chilean and foreign firms, and returned them to their former owners. Where the former owners no longer want these firms "the junta has promised to pay truly extortionate prices as compensation." This "compensation" to multi-billion firms is, of course, to be pressed out of the wages and life of the ordinary Chilean worker and citizen.
Chile will denationalize copper mines

SANTIAGO (Reuter-Special)--Chile's new military government will open up the five copper mines nationalized under the late President Salvador Allende to private foreign and Chilean investment, officials said yesterday.

They said the new government will pursue liberal economic policies based on private enterprise.

Toronto Star, September 20, 1973

In an interview with the head of the Chilean junta, a Time journalist reported that:

Pinochet indicated that there might be restoration of U.S. corporations' ownership of mines and factories taken over by Allende's leftist government. An economic team, the general revealed, is studying "all possibilities", including turning back nationalized firms to their former owners. "We will try to offer the greatest margin of liberty," he promised, in determining just who gets what.

Time, October 1, 1973

The U.S. former owners of the Chilean copper industry, however, showed little interest in the direct return of "their" plants and mines. They preferred to receive financial "compensation" for their nationalized firms. Here we have the Chilean generals and fascists willing to go even further than the multinational corporations in selling out Chile. The reason for the copper companies' preference of "compensation" to return of the industries is that they are assured of receiving vastly inflated payments for holdings which they have bled dry and for which they have already received massive payments in the past. It is much more profitable for the U.S. copper companies to now invest their "compensation" payments in other sectors of Chilean industry, which they will soon control completely.

SANTIAGO, Chile, September 28--Chile's new Foreign Minister, Adm. Ismael Huerta, said today that "the door is open" for a resumption of negotiations on compensation for United States copper holdings nationalized by the former Marxist coalition government.

But Admiral Huerta asserted that the copper mines would remain in government hands and that Chile would "maintain sovereignty over its natural resources" while welcoming foreign investment in other areas.

The holdings of three large United States copper companies--Kennecott, Anaconda, and the Cerro Corporation--were nationalized
under the government of the late President Allende and were nationalized with the unanimous approval of the legislature.

The value of these companies' assets here was variously estimated at $500 million to $700 million. But the Allende government levied $774 million against what it said were excess profits made by the companies here.

The dispute over compensation was the main factor in the souring of relations between the United States and Chile.

Copper remains Chile's most important resource, with exports providing more than 80% of the country's foreign exchange.

New York Times, September 24, 1973

SANITAGO (Reuter-UPI)--Chile's military regime, faced with a bankrupt economy, has moved to regain the confidence of foreign investors by promising to reopen talks on compensating U.S. companies whose holdings here were expropriated by the government of slain Marxist leader Salvador Allende.

Announcing the move, Admiral Ismael Huerta, the junta's foreign minister, said the government was ready to hold direct talks with the U.S. government which has not yet recognized the new Chilean regime.

He did not mention any U.S. companies by name.

Allende, who died in the bloody coup on September 11, took over 16 U.S. firms worth $700 million since his election in 1970. Most were copper mining enterprises, including the giant Anaconda Co. and Kennecott Copper Co.

The most controversial take over, however, involved the Chilean Telephone Co., a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). The U.S.-based conglomerate was investigated in the United States after news leaked out that it had offered the CIA $1 million in an effort to block Allende's election.

Toronto Star, October 1, 1973

Between September 24 and October 18, the Chilean Junta "returned" over 420 of the nationalized and government-run companies to their former owners, including the holdings of I.T.T. and 60 other U.S. companies. Many of these companies had already been compensated by the Popular Unity government or were in the process of working out reasonable compensation agreements. The clock has not been turned back. The U.S. copper giants will receive their $700 million blood money and the Chilean industrialists will now be able to run their factories in the good old 19th century free enterprise style they have always wanted.
Junta leaders have constantly referred to the foreign debt (mainly contracted by regimes previous to the Popular Unity government) and the cost of "compensating" foreign firms as totally more than $500 for every man, woman and child in Chile. Junta leaders have repeatedly said that the "solvency" of Chile will have to be accomplished by "belt tightening" and austerity for "everyone". In the context of everything which has happened, it is clear that the vast and extortionate blood payments to the multinational corporations will be squeezed and squeezed from the 'conquered' Chilean working classes.

**Labor Unions Outlawed, Wages Cut, Bosses Returned**

On September 25th, the Chilean Junta outlawed the Central Workers Confederation, the C.L.C. of Chile, which, with its member union, comprised over 70% of organized labor in Chile. Its funds, offices and buildings were seized and its former union and wage contracts declared null and void. Many of its leaders have been murdered, arrested or are in hiding. The 800,000 members of the Central Workers Confederation are now without union protection. The remaining 'legal' unions are largely those under the thumb of Junta supporters and are mainly company unions and white-collar professional organizations in the guise of labor unions. It is expected that these remaining "unions" will be used as tools of the Junta (as has already been the case of the ruck owners and white collar organizations in the mining towns).

*SANTIAGO, Chile, September 25--The military junta today abolished the largest labor organization in Chile.

A decree removed legal recognition from the Central Workers Confederation, saying that it had "transformed itself into an organ of political character, under the influences of foreign tendencies alien to the national spirit."

New York Times, September 26, 1973

The former owners of 350 state controlled factories have been placed back under the control of their industries and can now proceed to run the firms without the inconvenience of labor negotiations. Most of these industries had been run with a considerable degree of success by workers' committees in conjunction with government planning staff.

*SANTIAGO, Chile, September 24--The military junta has placed the vast majority of state-controlled factories and businesses back in the
hands of the executives who ran them before the government of President Salvador Allende Gossens was voted into power.

Former Manager Returns
"I heard about my reappointment on the radio", said Cristian Bulnes, the general manager of Soprole, the largest milk company in Santiago. "There were about 150 workers standing outside the plant when I arrived," he recounted. "But I walked past all of them, and I did not even think about being scared."

Since the return of Mr. Bulnes to Soprole, 22 employees have been suspended indefinitely.

Business Group Consulted

"My own impression is that the military government wants production and labor discipline."

Although Mr. Bulnes discovered that he had been reappointed by turning on his radio, his name was not picked out of a hit.

When the military junta took over, it consulted the Chilean Society for Industrial Development--the most influential business association in the country--for a list of experienced people to run the companies that had fallen under state control during the Allende regime.

New York Times, September 25, 1973

Salaries Cut, Work Week Increased by Decree

In the economic sphere, the government today put into effect a decree requiring workers to work at least half a day on Saturdays, thus raising the required workweek from 44 to 48 hours.

In many cases, the increased workweek has been raised from 40 to 48 hours. In neither case will there be an increase in pay. In fact, salaries have been substantially cut.

New York Times, October 12, 1973

Chilean workers, meanwhile went to their jobs today, apparently accepting the junta's suspension of a 200 percent wage hike ordered by Allende.

The junta said yesterday it had "temporarily suspended" the wage increase, which was to take effect today, because Allende's financial policies had brought Chile to "a state of economic prostration."

.........
Last week, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the junta commander said "It will be a hard road to national reconstruction. It will be necessary to tighten our belts and I will be among the first to do so."

Toronto Star, October 10, 1973

When generals and millionaires talk about "everybody" tightening their belts, you can be sure that workers are in for a tough time.

Unions have been outlawed, leaders arrested, rank and file union supporters fired, the work week increased, pay cut and businesses handed back to the sole control of the former owners who now have the police at hand to support their every action. Strikes, naturally, have also been outlawed and can be treated as subversion.

The recent pay cuts and pay freezes of workers (but not of profits, of course) is doubly rapacious in view of the financial policy of the generals and their advisors. In October the junta announced that it was devaluing the Chilean currency by approximately 200%. This means that many of the basic necessities--many food items and clothing--have in the last weeks almost doubled in price. With pay freezes, the workers' real income has dropped disastrously. Considering the relatively narrow margin of most worker budgets even previously, such a cut in real income may mean extensive malnutrition.

Yesterday, the government announced new rates for the dollar, which will mean that prices for food and fuel imports, or 40% of last year's total consumption, will increase over 1,000 percent. Other imports will more than double in price.

New York Times, October 3, 1973

SANTIAGO (Reuters)--massive price increases for consumer goods, foods and services went into effect in Chile yesterday in a bid by the military government to stimulate production.

The increases ranged from 200 to 400 percent in most cases, but were far higher for a selected number of articles and produce.

Toronto Star, October 19, 1973

A week after the putsch, one reporter secretly interviewed a young factory worker in the San Miguel district.

"All right, so they have killed Comrade Allende," a 23 year old factory hand there said. "But they have only proved to us who our real enemies are. There is going to be a very long struggle, but the real fight is only beginning now." ... The paramilitary carabinero police are still searching house to house in communities such as San Miguel and are being given full cooperation--on the surface.
We don't tell them anything at all and they know that some of us are helping to hide people from the left," the factory hand said. "So we shall all go back to work like good boys, keep very quiet and get ready for the next time."

New York Times, September 18, 1973
In order to break this will, this widespread passive resistance, the junta has lately moved into a second phase of purges.

Firings and Purges

Over and above those thousands of persons who have been killed, the thousands who are now in hiding, and the tens of thousands in various prisons and concentration camps, tens of thousands of surviving workers and supporters of the Popular Unity government are now being fired and blacklisted from jobs they still hold.

Estimates of the number of workers, teachers and rank and file employees who have been fired in the growing wave of purges run into the tens of thousands. Some estimates run as high as 40,000 persons purged in the recent weeks. This process began after the Chilean junta returned sole and unrestricted control of all state run firms over to private owners.

Consider the single case of a woman whose family supported the Popular Unity government and whose husband is not in prison, whereabouts unknown.

Laura speaks of the fear of the people in the working class districts, where she works; of old women who came to her asking for poison to take to their sons, held with other suspected leftists in the national stadium, which has been converted into a prison; of bodies dumped by military trucks after curfew, so disfigured by being beaten that they cannot be recognized; of the huge layoffs of workers, dismissed because they supported the Allende regime; of people who cannot find jobs anywhere else. "Our main concern now is survival," she said.

Globe and Mail, October 12, 1973

The physician has worked in a Santiago hospital for 12 years and is now waiting to hear that he is "no longer wanted". Though a sympathizer of Allende's Socialist policies, he says he has never been a member of any political party.

"But I was a friend of Patricio Gijon, Allende's personal doctor, who is
now a prisoner on Dawson Island. And that is a stigma which I’m sure I cannot escape."

A week ago a small but telling message appeared on hospital notice boards: "Doctors must hand in their personal histories as soon as possible. These will be studied by an outside commission in charge of restructuring medical services."

Similar "studies" are reportedly being conducted in offices and institutions all over the country, and provide a glimpse of the pervasive campaign designed to purge Chile from leftists high and low.

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During the three weeks they have been in power, Chile’s armed forces have removed more than 500 people from government posts and the military appointees now heading ministries, government departments and state-owned corporations are getting down to "cleaning the rank and file."

Doctors, teachers, engineers and administrators have been called in to discuss their political views and sympathies, and many report they have been unable to pass the "examinations".

Toronto Star, October 4, 1973

In Temuco, regional and local government officials, teachers, and many workers connected with or who supported the Popular Unity government or its programs were fired (if not placed in jail). In addition to massive purges of Temuco’s three universities, the purge has also enveloped the local banks, which came under government control under the Allende regime, and even the hospitals and clinics, which were said to be under Marxist domination.

New York Times, October 6, 1973

In addition to the firings, arrests are continuing and spreading to the rank and file supporters of the Popular Unity government.

There were reports today of new arrests here and around the country. Six nurses aides at the Salvador Hospital in Santiago have been detained as "extremists" and during a recent raid on two working class suburbs of the capital, La Bandera and Nueva Florida, the armed forces arrested 69 "extremists" and 76 "delinquents".

In Arica, 150 "Marxists", including 19 foreigners, have been reported detained.
Turning Back the Clock in Other Areas; Land Reform Halted

Two weeks after the putsch, the Chilean generals announced that no further land redistribution would take place. The land reform legislation as carried out by the Popular Unity government (but passed into law by previous governments) was placed in abeyance by the junta. Large numbers of rural farm workers remained landless and much of the best land was still held by a relatively small stratum of wealthy farm owners.

The junta's position at first was: *peasants who benefited from land reform measures will be given their holdings but the wealthy farmers with more than 40 hectares (88 acres) threatened by agrarian reform have now had their "inalienable" rights confirmed.*

Le Monde (English edition), September 28, 1973

In point of fact, the counter reform has been much more rapacious. Many tracts of land which were distributed have been taken back by former large landholders with the support of their armed gangs. (The paramilitary, armed fascist organizations rose first around these large landholders.) Cooperative farms and ranches of all sorts are under intensive political, administrative and physical pressure to disband. And in general, the rural working class and small farmers are defenseless against the demands of the large land holders whom the junta have not set in charge of the "land and farm production" development.

A report of the rapid and massive counter reform which has occurred just below the official surface and which has turned back the clock a generation or more comes from the southern province of Cautin.

*But the greatest source of conflict was in the rural areas, where the political polarization was complicated by an endemic Indian problem.*

More than half of Chile’s 600,000 Indians are concentrated in Cautin Province while they slightly outnumber the descendants of European settlers. At the turn of the century, when the whites had cleared the pine and poplar forests that once covered the area, the Mapuches, the Indians are called, were confined to reservations and deeded the poorer lands.

Decades later, the Indian landholdings wee far too small for their rapidly growing population, and even before the Allende government took over, the Mapuches, claiming ancestral rights over adjoining properties, seized some land illegally.

*But under the Marxist coalition government, about 460 farms totaling more than 200,000 acres were seized by Mapuches led by leftist*
university students.

(But since the putsch) According to Michael Fusslocher, a director of the local agricultural association, more than 90 percent of the seized farms have been returned to their owners since the military coup.

New York Times, October 6, 1973

Only one Mapuche cooperative farm, of 14 families, which had been in existence for over 30 years, was allowed to remain on its land. It seems probable that a similar process of counter-reform has proceeded, sub rosa, in other parts of the Chilean countryside.

In Santa Cruz, 320 miles north of Temuco, a coalition of well-organized anti-Marxist farmers and local military leaders has established firm control over a poor peasantry that largely supported the Allende government.

The junta quickly assured the farmers that private ownership of land would be the cornerstone of a new agrarian policy and that no more land would be expropriated.

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At the same time, the government is warning peasants that within a year they must meet minimum production levels--still to be set--or else face a drastic reorganization of the hundreds of farm cooperatives created during the Allende years, possibly including their division into private plots.

New York Times, October 19, 1973

Health Clinics and Non-Profit Food Stores Closed in Working Class Areas

In keeping with the Chilean generals' policy of maximizing profit for the Chilean middle class (at least its supporters) and of eliminating all social, economic and cultural gains of the working class, the junta has eliminated most clinics, free medicines, and subsidized food outlets in the working class areas.

In most poblaciones, the military government has radically altered the delivery of food and medical services, formerly under Marxist control.

Government warehouses that used to distribute food and household essentials at cheap, subsidized prices have been closed in favor of more expensive private groceries and other shops.
The clinic system created under the Allende government to bring medical facilities into the poorest neighborhoods is being dismantled in favor of the large central hospital system backed by conservative medical authorities.

In Nogales, a poblacion in the western outskirts of the capital, the clinic was closed down and its chief physician, Dr. Claudio Webbe, has been detained in the national stadium with several thousand other political prisoners.

New York Times, October 17, 1973

Ambulance, clinic, ad public medical care have already been largely withdrawn from the poblaciones which house half of Santiago's three and a half million people. In addition, cultural centers, adult education centers, day care centers for infants of working mothers and similar social programs have been widely eliminated on the suspicion of being centers of subversion or have been sharply curtailed. How far this trend back to 19th century capitalism will go is not certain because the driving force behind it is not even a purely rational exploitation of the working class by the rulers.

The destruction of even the moderate, and simply human, gains of the working class during the Popular Unity government has to be seen as part of the rabid hate and punishment now being meted out against those sectors of society which dared to challenge the rule of the upper and middle classes. One observer commented, even before the putsch took place, that "the respectable ladies and gentlemen of Chile will never be able to forgive Allende that he provided a half litre of milk for every school child while they sometimes missed cream for their coffee." The program of free milk to schoolchildren has now been eliminated. (Marxist milk and sugar, clearly.)

Newspapers Closed, Strict Censorship Imposed

One of the first acts of the Chilean generals was to seize all forms of mass media in the country. They either imposed their own editors and censors, or closed the presses down. Twenty-six newspapers and weeklies were either destroyed or closed because they had supported the Popular Unity government. Initially, only two newspapers, The Mercurio and The Tercera Hora, extreme right-wing organs, were allowed to function by the junta. Later, a number of other non-Popular Unity
newspapers were allowed to publish, but under the strict control of army and police officers who acted as editors and censors. In the majority of cases, the middle class press was quite amenable to parrot whatever pronouncement or news release the junta distributed, regardless of how fantastic. The leading newspaper of fascist Chile has become El Mercurio, owned and run by the Edwards family (one of, if not the wealthiest, families in Chile). The owner is Augustin Edwards, who now lives in the U.S. and is the Vice President of the Pepsi Cola Co.

Newspapers are allowed to print only what they are told. Their material has been mainly a campaign of slander and denunciation of the leaders of the Popular Unity government, continuous and repetitious justification of the putsch and the repression in progress, and airy support for the new "liberty in discipline". Most menacingly, the newspapers have been quick to sense and elaborate on the junta's (and their own) taste for vengeance against the working class, and have carried out a campaign of stimulating denunciation, revenge, and fear of foreigners and all progressive forces.

All radio and T.V. stations in Chile have also been placed under the direction of junta officers and censors. They, too, have been stimulating a climate of repression, fear and denunciation. In many cases, junta censors are probably not required since most of the radio and television personalities and their owners are among the strongest fascist supporters.

Frontiers and airports of Chile remained closed to all international traffic for the fourth day. Censorship was imposed on the domestic press and on foreign newsmen's dispatches sent abroad.

A government announcement said that 26 newspapers and magazines had been told to suspend publication indefinitely because they were opposed to the junta's goal of "depoliticizing Chile".

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation said that one of its correspondents, Michel Gauthier, was questioned briefly by police in Santiago. C.B.C. said that Mr. Gauthier was released last night and was returned to Canada.

Only two Chilean newspapers were published today. They were El Mercurio and La Tercera de la Hora, both opponents of the deposed government.

New York Times, September 14, 1973
But now the Marxist newspapers and radio stations have been banned. The remaining journals do little more than parrot official statements and
attack the deposed regime. Military censors sit in newspaper offices but they are probably unnecessary since editors share their point of view.

New York Times, September 28, 1973

It must be remembered that the Chilean press and mass media, throughout the Allende period, was as free as any press in the Western world. This is recognized by all independent observers. In fact, most of the mass media opposed the Popular Unity government and many of them helped sabotage food marketing through their misrepresentations. Some of the most reactionary newspapers, like The Mercurio and The Tercera Hora actually published calls to violence and for the overthrow of the democratically elected Popular Unity government. Freedom of the press, according to The Mercurio and according to its readership of businessmen and professional people, is now safe under the protection of the junta's guidance--safe for the wealthy.

One recent sign of dissatisfaction by a Christian Democratic newspaper was reported in the Manchester Guardian.

However, the Tribuna editor said the September 11 coup had meant the death of democratic journalism.

"We have directed journalism, exactly as it exists in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries," Leigh replied.

The editor bluntly told the general that the situation was worse than it had been under Salvador Allende'

"That is the price that journalists and the public will have to pay for a while for having achieved other liberties (the general replied).

.........

The discontented tone of the editor's questions is the first sign that the Chilean Christian Democrats, initially the most enthusiastic supporter of the coup, are beginning to have second thoughts.

Toronto Star, October 10, 1973

Such are the minor squabbles between thieves and murderers.

Censorship of Incoming and Outgoing News

In addition to the control, closure, and censorship of Chilean newspapers and mass media, the junta seized control of or imposed censorship upon all external news agencies, information services and foreign reporters operating in the country. Military censors control much of the reports coming out of Chile. Furthermore, foreign reporters were
barred from entering Chile more than a week following the putsch (the period when the bloodiest massacres occurred). Since then, foreign reporters have been effectively barred from entering much of Chile so that most of the available accounts come from Santiago.

Intense pressure has been applied by the junta to reporters from almost the entire spectrum of the world press. Reports unfavorable to the junta or reports which detail the nature of the repressions lead first to arrest and intensive questioning and to expulsion from the country. (How rapidly this is done depends upon the influence of the journal involved.) Reporters from virtually every major foreign newspaper or news agency have been detained for questioning or expelled.

A reporter for Time magazine was arrested for merely walking by the sacked Socialist Party of Chile headquarters (Time, October 1). In some cases, such treatment by the junta has resulted in markedly more favorable reports by some newsmen.

SANTIAGO, Chile--After a week's interrogation by Chilean authorities, Swedish newspaper correspondent Bobi Sourander is to be expelled from the country.

"There are very good reasons for us to want him out," a spokesman for the Chilean military regime led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet said, "but it is not convenient for us to tell you why."

This is the fifth expulsion order in a week against foreign correspondents in Santiago, including another Swede, Lief Person, and the Le Monde correspondent, Philippe Labreveux. In no case has any reason been given.

A number of other members of the foreign press have been detained for questioning vary varying periods, and one Brazilian writer, Flavio Lara of the Rio de Janeiro weekly Opiniao, has disappeared since his arrest at Santiago's Pudahuel Airport on September 24. The spokesman said he has no record of Flavio Lars being held at a prison camp set up in Santiago's National Stadium

Toronto Star, October 19, 1973

Foreign newsmen have also been having trouble with the authorities, the correspondents for the Washington Post and the French daily Figaro were interrogated about their reports yesterday, and today the home of
Newsweek's resident reporter, Dwight Porter, was visited today by six carabineros, or national policemen. They confiscated books and magazines generally dealing with Marxism and Chilean left. Mr. Porter is a United States citizen.

New York Times, September 23, 1973

This afternoon, Marlise Simons, correspondent for the Washington Post, was detained by two plainclothes men in her hotel, according to a witness. Miss Simons was one of the few foreign correspondents here during the coup. It was learned that Miss Simons had been taken to the fifth floor of the Ministry of Defense "for questioning of her copy."
She was released tonight after four hours of questioning.

This morning, a spokesman for the military junta promised to give newsmen all that they needed "to report the truth."

New York Times, September 20, 1973

A very partial list of news agencies and newspapers who have had reporters detained, questioned, or expelled are the C.B.C., Le Monde, Figaro, Der Spiegel, Newsweek, Time, the Washington Post, and various Scandinavian, British and Latin American newspaper. According to the junta, they are all part of an international Communist plot to discredit the "salvationist forces" of the "New Chile" (i.e. the generals and their supporters).

The Chilean junta is angry about its poor image abroad, and blames foreign correspondents here for "deliberate distortion." One official statement last week claimed that most correspondents are Communist agents infiltrated into the country.

Toronto Star, October 19, 1973

Similarly, the junta claims that its critics abroad, throughout the world, are either part of an international Marxist conspiracy or are dupes of the conspiracy. Included in this category, according to a press statement by General Leigh of the junta, are those members of the U.S. Congress who in mid-October blocked an emergency loan to the Chilean armed forces.

Campaign of Book Burning and Sacking of Cultural Centers

A secondary but striking example of the fascist mentality of the Chilean generals and their supporters is the campaign of book burning, sacking of cultural centers, and destruction of any symbols of popular culture. While
hardly comparable to the arrest, torture and murder of thousands of Chileans, the campaign against books and popular culture does underline the junta's approach to dealing with dissenting ideas.

Teams of army and police have cordoned off whole sections of Santiago and other cities and have made house-by-house searches at gunpoint. In some cases, making two or three sweeps of a single area, especially in the working class areas. In hundreds, possibly thousands of cases, private homes have been sacked and looted when any evidence of support for the Popular Unity government has been found. Books which the Chilean junta and their semi-literate police term "Marxist-socialist", subversive, or just plain "suspect have been taken in such searches and publicly burned in the streets. Bookstores and public and university libraries have too been ransacked by the police under the directive of "purifying" the intellectual life of Chile and eradicating sources of disharmony. All this proceeds under junta pronouncements of re-establishing "social peace". Suspect literature has included not only socialist works but also anything which smacks of social analysis, sociology being particularly distrusted by the police, as well as much foreign literature of any sort. The absurd anti-foreign fanaticism of the Chilean junta is particularly paradoxical considering where it draws its support from.

STREET FIRES. Government spokesman Federico Willoughby told newsmen that "book burning is totally contrary to the policy of this government." If so, the policy was not being well enforced. Last week soldiers on a house-to-house search of Santiago's San Borja district--a fashionable leftist stronghold--broke through locked doors and tossed thousands of books and papers out of apartment windows. Among the works consumed in impromptu street fires were Mao's Little Red Book, novels by Mark Twain, economic studies by John Kenneth Galbraith--and old copies of Time.

Time, October 8, 1973

Similar bonfires and looting accompany most of the mass searched, with looting and destruction particularly intense in the working class areas of Santiago.

When the army sealed off two areas of the city, Santa Lucia and San Borja, it systematically searched every building and three whole libraries of books out of windows, later making street bonfires of them.

Le Monde (English edition), September 28, 1973

In at least some cases, it is not only books which are destroyed, but their owners as well. Two American university students were arrested in
their apartment on September 20 and taken to the National Stadium. One, Franc Terrugi, an economics student, was found in the Santiago morgue with two bullet wounds in his body. The surviving student gave this account of their arrest.

He came to Chile a year ago after getting his Bachelor Arts degree in Latin American Studies from Amherst College and was planning to do graduate work in sociology, but first took training as a lathe operator. He had been working for two months in an appliance factory to study first-hand the problems of introducing socialism to a country.

Mr. Hathaway said that about half a dozen paramilitary policemen raided their apartment and seized about 30 books, many more on Marxism, as well as personal letters.

"One of the policemen told me 'these books are more dangerous than bombs because bombs go off and are over, but these books go into your head and rot your mind,'" Mr. Hathaway related.

Mr. Hathaway asserted that the policeman's fear of foreigners was apparent in their interrogations.

New York Times, September 10, 1973

Undoubtedly the most dramatic and shocking example of the junta's intellectual barbarism was its treatment of Pablo Neruda and the destruction of the Neruda cultural center. Pablo Neruda, son of a Chilean railway worker, winner of the Nobel prize for poetry in 1971, Communist, and generally acknowledged as the greatest Latin American poet in a generation, died in Santiago one week after the putsch. At 69 and already ill with cancer, he died of a heart attack in a junta-controlled clinic. What role junta assassins had in his death, if any, is still not clear. According to Hortensia Allende, widow of the murdered President,

And just as today we grieve for the death of Salvador Allende, the death of our beloved poet Pablo Neruda, a Nobel literature prize winner, also gives us great sorrow.

And that's another crime. Because the military junta is to blame for his death, too.

The fascists are guilty--why? Because he was sick in bed, in Isla Negra. Salvador and I, we had visited him only recently. The national police broke into his house. They cut his telephone and they did not permit entry for the medicines that were very necessary for the cancer that he had. So
they're materially and morally responsible for his death, too, a man everyone mourns.

Toronto Star, October 13, 1973

Because of Neruda's international prestige, the junta was moved to cry crocodile tears at the poet's death, with the junta's chief Pinochet commenting "he enjoys the affection of all of us because he is a national glory." (New York Times, September 16) However, a few hours before his death, Neruda's home, which he had given to the Chilean people as a library and cultural center, was sacked by junta carabineros and fascist supporters. Burned, destroyed, or stolen by these gangs were Neruda's considerable library, paintings, and mementos of three generations of Latin America's writers, artists and popular leaders. Also destroyed were the irreplaceable manuscripts of Neruda's memoirs, covering 50 year of reminiscences of a man in the mainstream of Latin American intellectual life. All were a bequest by Neruda to the people of Chile and Latin America.

While the destruction of even such irreplaceable manuscripts and intellectual works does not compare with the destruction of life in which the junta is engaged, their actions in the Neruda case clearly underline what sort of mentality the "saviors of civilization" in Chile have.

At Neruda's hasty funeral, 1,800 mourners--workers, intellectuals and rank and file supporters of the Popular Unity government--braved arrest by singing the "Internationale" as a final tribute to the poet.

"With Neruda, we bury Salvador Allende," the mourners cried. Mr. Neruda was a close friend of the Socialist President, who died during the military coup d'état and was buried secretly in the presence of only close members of his family and representatives of the military.

Outside the cemetery, heavy contingents of troops and carabineros, or paramilitary police, stood on the alert with machine guns and rifles. But the crowd disperses rapidly after the service and there was no incident.

New York Times, September 16, 1973

This was to be the last open and "peaceful" defiance of the new regime which the junta allowed, presumably due to the presence at the funeral of ambassadors of Sweden, Mexico, and Rumanian.

One example of international reaction was as follows:

The Authors League of America, representing 6,000 writers, and Grove Press, the publishing house, sent separate cablegrams to Chile yesterday decrying what were described as acts by the ruling junta against writers in Chile and their works.
Barney Rosset, the president of Grove Press, sent the following cable to Gen. August Pinochet Ugarte, the head of the military junta that overthrew the Marxist government of President Salvador Allende earlier this month:

"Humanity stands aghast at your infamous sacking and butchery of the literary testament of Pablo Neruda. Your act recalls the worst days of Hitler's Third Reich.

The entire civilized world is watching you and hoping that your desecrations of the human spirit will cease immediately.

New York Times, September 27, 1973

They didn't, of course.

Glimpses of Junta Cultural and Educational Policy

The control of all universities in Chile, what will be taught in them, what will be read and who will be allowed to attend is now in the hands of military men. Junta officers have been made the rectors, the heads of all universities in the country. They and their fascist supporters now direct "higher education"--for a start.

SANTIAGO, Chile, September 29--the military government has announced that it will replace all university rectors with military appointees in the next ten days, thus ending Chile's long tradition of university autonomy.

The action is in keeping with similar attempts by the new junta to extend its control over Chilean institutions and remodel them in a strong anti-Marxist style.

The communiqué added that the military delegates replacing the rectors would undertake a study to reorganize the university system.

Rector Regrets Move

Commenting on the junta's decision, Dr. Eduardo Boeninger, the non-Marxist rector of the University of Chile, said:

"I regret it, obviously I will obey it, but I lament it."

Another spokesman for the university--the largest in Chile with about 125,000 students in campuses over the country--said that educators had
recently met with the military officials in an effort to convince them that their intervention was unnecessary.

New York Times, September 10, 1973
Four hundred miles to the south, in the provincial capital of Temuco the closed universities were reopened under military official purged of supporters of the Popular Unity government.
Among the absent were a dozen professors and several hundred students accused by the new school administration and local police of being left wing activists. Those found guilty (by denunciation and Military Tribunal) will never be allowed to attend a Chilean university again.

New York Times, October 6, 1973
The "purification" of Chilean intellectual life rapidly spread to public and private high schools and grade schools as well.
Meanwhile, the junta launched a campaign to offset any ideological influences the Allende government might have had on educational systems throughout the country.

Authorities of state and private schools, where activities were resumed yesterday for the first time since the coup, were told to withdraw all textbooks tending to influence pupils toward "certain ideologies".

Globe and Mail, October 2, 1973
The few newspapers which are still allowed to publish in Santiago were agreed; the junta couldn't have made a better choice (for a Minister of Education). The Tercera (Hora) praised his 'rich experience', La Segunda (another right wing newspaper praised his singular praxis' since he had been to a training course in the U.S. for artillery fire, distant warning systems for torpedoes and a course on torpedoes and sonar, The Mercurio summarized that 'the officer is the most perfectly suited for his task.' Thus, Lieut. Admiral Hugo Castro Jimenez became the Minister of Education in Chile.

...........

Barely after his acceptance of the ministry, the new Minister of Education, Admiral Castro, decided that the departments (and the study of) Philosophy, Sociology, and Journalism will no longer be allowed in Chilean universities for the indefinite future because of their Marxist direction.

Der Spiegel, October 22, 1973
University and intellectual life in general is suspect by the junta and their supporters. Students and teachers who specialized in the social sciences, economics, and history have felt the particular brunt of the
reaction, many having been imprisoned and murdered (especially if they were attempting to apply their studies to improving the life of the Chilean people). But there appear to be sufficient Chilean "intellectuals" who supported the putsch, willing to play along with the generals.

Loreto Guerrero Correa, a sociologist and interpreter, feels "immense relief that the country has been freed from the threat of a Marxist 'dictatorship' and has faith that the military will restore order and democratic rule. She is representative of the vast majority of middle class women who played an active role in opposition to the Allende government and now firmly support the junta.

.........

She complained of cultural privations: "We felt completely cut off. Musicians, ballets, American movies stopped coming because there were no dollars to pay for them."

"I trust the military as human beings," Loreto says confidently. "I think they are honest and don't want power. There merely want to set things in order and will go back to the barracks when things are normalized."

Globe and Mail, October 2, 1973

These are the people who are now rising in directing the Chilean universities, not only in social studies, but in architecture, city planning, chemical engineering, medicine, etc. The cultural deprivation of which Loreto Guerrero Corres complained is now being set right by the junta. American gangster movies, new T.V. series of the F.B.I. and other cultural refinements are not entering Chile again.

SANTIAGO, Chile, October 2--Chile's military junta announced today that it would import 15 American films this week, "putting an end to the black night of Marxist cinema here."

The armed forces network gave broad publicity to the importation of films as "a return to normality."

Today, the government broadcast said, "the shortage of movies was as serious as the shortage of sugar." It said that the imported films would suit "all tastes".

The importation of films will undoubtedly satisfy the middle class more than the masses because there will necessarily be arise in admission fees.

"Under Allende, maybe the movies were old and not very good," one student said, "but at least everybody could afford to go."
The price for a ticket in the best movie house in town is only 20 escudos--the price of a shoeshine or a newspaper. Theatre men here are demanding that prices be increased tenfold.

...........

The National Independent Film Association has urged the new government to liberalize the import of films, particularly United States films. They have specifically asked for "The Godfather", "The French Connection", "Clockwork Orange", "Cabaret", and "Last Tango in Paris". The government said these would be included among the first imports.

New York Times, October 3, 1973

This remarkably open admission of the priority of cultural tasks of the junta supporters--violence, gangsterism, police violence, sadism--has been evident in the changes in "cultural" production within Chile since the coup.

Leftist newspapers have not been allowed to publish and the anti-Marxist dailies enforce a self-censorship, with not the barest criticism of the new government. Besides their own news programs, radio stations must broadcast several times a day bulletins prepared by the armed forces.

Even the radio soap operas seem to reflect martial preferences. One popular drama now being broadcast is a play about Diego Portales, a 19th century strongman revered by present-day military leaders.

"Minister Portales rescued the Fatherland from chaos and government immorality," the introduction to each daily saga says.

New York Times, September 26, 1973

Later in the same week the junta, as part of a widespread program of renaming buildings, streets and neighborhoods in keeping with the "new Chile", renamed the Gabiela Mistral conference center in Santiago the General Diego Portales Centre. General Mistral was Chile' first Nobel Prize winning poet, one of the most respected in Latin America, who died in 1957.

Less well known but more representative of the junta's cultural policy is the fact that in the first days of the putsch it murdered Victor Jara, a strong supporter of the Popular Unity government and the leading folk song-folk opera composer in Chile. In the last five years his songs had spread through much of Latin America. Also murdered by the fascists, during the massacre at the School of Art/Technical University (in
Santiago) were many of the performers of the folk opera *Iquique*, a memorium to hundreds of nitrate miners and their families killed by the army during a strike in northern Chile 65 years ago.

**Refugees in Chile and the Actions of Foreign Embassies**

At the time of the fascist putsch there were somewhat more than 13,000 refugees in Chile, most of them from other Latin American countries under military dictatorship. The majority of these refugees were supporters of the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende. Since the putsch, the Chilean government has launched a campaign of mass hysteria and calumny against these refugees. They have become a convenient scapegoat against which the junta is attempting to direct the fears and frustrations of the more backward sectors of Chilean society. The mass media campaigns of the junta amount to an open incitation of vigilante action against the refugees. Teams of army-police and fascist vigilantes have murdered foreign refugees in Chile. The nature and extent of this repression has already been documented. The lives of the remaining refugees are in constant danger.

There has been an almost psychotic campaign of hatred mounted against foreign refugees in Chile.

*Chilean political fugitives and foreigners are searching desperately for places of safety after the military junta clamped down on access to foreign embassies here.*

*The search for refuge has reached near hysteria with the widespread knowledge of the deaths after arrest of a number of foreigners.*

..........*The military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet, has launched a hate campaign against the foreigners, accusing them of being imported killers of Chileans and blaming them for the climate of violence.*

*And an official request for all citizens to denounce "extremists" has led to the detention of many innocents.*

*Many Latin American embassies are doing little or nothing to aid their citizens, and the "safe" havens, despite an agreement by the Minister of the Interior, with the United Nations, Red Cross and church groups, that*
they should be inviolable, can be entered by troops whenever he gives the authorization.

Toronto Star, October 11, 1973

A handful of foreign embassies in Santiago remain as the only havens for the security of those who supported the democratically elected Popular Unity government. Some of the ambassadors and their staffs have rendered an account of themselves which is truly humane and even heroic.

Some envoys, notably Sweden's Harald Edelstam, have done their best to help. (It was not the first time that Edelstam had helped exiles in distress; during World War II he won the sobriquet "the Black Pimpernel" for smuggling Nazi victims out of Norway.) By contrast, both the U.S. and Communist China have turned all exiles away from their embassy doors.

Conditions inside the embassies harboring most of the refugees--Mexico, Argentina, Panama and Venezuela--are spartan at best. In the Panamanian embassy, 260 people have crowded into three rooms and share a single toilet. At one point, the Argentine embassy held more than 500 people including 100 children.

Newsweek, October 5, 1973

The Canadian embassy was another which **closed** its doors to exiles and refugees.

But,

Although the junta, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet, has relentlessly campaigned against the "13,000 foreign extremists who have poisoned the Chilean atmosphere", many of Chile's foreign residents are teachers and technicians attracted to Chile's progressive policies since the time of Christian Democrat president Eduardo Frei. Many of these have been able to take refuge inside their embassies, many are under arrest and others presumably are hiding, hoping the anti-foreigner campaign will subside.

Toronto Star, October 4, 1973

The junta has said that there are 14,000 "armed foreigners" in the country and that many are training leftists.

The government set up a special unit today to interrogate foreigners. Many thousands of Brazilians, Bolivians, Uruguayans, Cubans and other Latin Americans are said to have been picked up apparently because of their contacts with the leftist organizations here.

New York Times, September 20, 1973

The military also tried to rally Chilean opinion to its side by insisting that many of Allende's leftist supporters consisted of "foreign elements".
The junta issued a list of aliens being sought for questioning that named 4,187 Bolivians, 2,139 Argentines, 987 Cubans, 1,300 Brazilians and 3,266 Uruguayans. Many others were already under arrest.

Time, October 1, 1973

"The courts are going to be very severe with foreigners," Pinochet told newsmen, "because it is unacceptable that these persons, who came to receive education, appeared later as extremists, killing out own citizens."

New York Times, September 19, 1973

The point of the junta's witch-hunt against foreign refugees is, of course, an attempt to distract the attention of sectors of the middle class who, while not socialist, are also not fascist. The aim is to create the convenient and much used scapegoat of "foreign trouble makers" to distract a section of Chilean middle class from the fact of the massive support given to the Popular Unity government by the Chilean working class. Foreign refugees from Latin American dictators are easy targets.

The Swedish ambassador to Chile is the representative of a country of approximately equal power as Canada's:

Virtually alone, Harald Edelstam saved the Cuban embassy from being stormed and provided protection to Chilean, Brazilian and other political refugees. He is a prime mover behind an international effort to win guarantees for security for opponents of Chile's new military rulers.

Mr. Edelstam, the Swedish ambassador here, became known as "The Black Pimpernel" in World War II when he served in the Norwegian Resistance while he was his country's Vice Consul in Norway. Today, he presented to the Chilean Foreign Minister, Vice Adm. Ismael Huerta, an offer from the Swedish government to receive 200 refugees from Chile on "humanitarian" grounds.

"Our role, the role of the Swedish embassy, is humanitarian--to try to save the lives of people who are in danger," Ambassador Edelstam said in an interview.

We know there are lists of people who supported the former regime and who are considered by the new military authorities as criminals and therefore could be executed," Me. Edelstam said.

...........

The Swedish Ambassador has assumed charge of all Cuban property and of about 20 political refugees in the Cuban chancery. Among the refugees is Max Marambio, the leader of Dr. Allende's personal guard and a man wanted by the junta. "To protect out guests," the Ambassador sleeps nightly at the Cuban embassy.
The trouble now is that the military refused to give safe conduct passes to exiles until their cases have been examined," Mr. Edelstam said. Sweden, like most European countries, does not have an agreement with Chile on political asylum, but can offer protection to persons whose lives are in danger.

In addition to have Cuban charges, Mr. Edelstam must look out for another score of refugees in the Swedish chancery. There are mostly Brazilian and Chilean intellectuals who were militant Allende supporters. A young American woman from Madison, Wisconsin, with a 2-year-old baby, said she had first gone to the American embassy for help. The woman, who would not give her name, said she was told at the embassy to see the Chilean police. "And so I came to the Swedish embassy for help," she added.

New York Times, September 29, 1973

In a television interview, C.T.V.'s program "W5" recorded these words from the Swedish Ambassador to Chile on a September 30 broadcast.

Mr. Edelstam: The junta shot anyone who was thought to be a friend of President Allende. So refugees just stormed the (Swedish) embassy. Now we have tried to protect those whose lives are in danger, but we have great difficulties. ... Some ambassadors have been very good, especially the Mexican ambassador, who filled the embassy and chancery with refugees. Other ambassadors were less human.

Ambassador Edelstam did not mention the Canadian ambassador by name, but he might have said "less than human". The Canadian ambassador, and embassy, "our" representatives, seem to have played a conscious and callous part in helping the Chilean junta liquidate its opponents.

A handful of embassies in Santiago accepted and saved the lives of hundreds, thousands in total, of persons sought by the junta. Some of these, like the Mexican embassy, are representatives of countries which have not as yet even recognized the Chilean junta. The Canadian embassy, in comparison, provided 'sanctuary' to two persons during the first weeks of the putsch and the terror. Later, up to a dozen persons were allowed to remain in the Canadian embassy. All political persons, or those sought by the junta, were strictly excluded. The fact that only a small number of Chileans and exiles ever applied to the Canadian embassy for protection during the terror indicates that most knowledgeable Chileans knew of the sympathies and support given to the junta by the Canadian ambassador."
Canada's Ambassador Backs Army Coup in Chile"

The above is the front-page headline of the Toronto Star for September 26th. The full text of Ambassador Andrew Ross' lengthy cable to Mitchell Sharp on September 13 indicates virtually unrestricted support of the Chilean junta. Later actions by Ross show that this support did not waver even after the openly fascist nature of the junta was clear to all observers.

Canada's ambassador to Chile has told the federal government that any delay in recognizing the new military regime in Santiago could "delay Chile's eventual return to democratic process."

In a confidential cable that was sent two days after the September 11 army overthrow of Marxist President Salvador Allende, Ambassador Andrew Rose said it would be wrong for Ottawa to view the take over as a "rightest coup."

.........

Ross was in Buenos Aires buying a car when the coup took place. He quickly returned to Santiago.

In the cable, a copy of which was obtained by The Star, Ross told Ottawa:

"In overthrowing the Allende government, Chile's military and police have accepted an exceedingly difficult and probably thankless task. Our regret that extra-constitutional and undemocratic means were adopted must be tempered, in my view, by the following main considerations:

"Disintegration of normal institutional systems had brought the country to verge of anarchy and, given the intransigence of politicians, the armed forces command structure offered the only apparently viable temporary alternative."

"The military had exhausted, at least in my own view, possibilities of participating or collaborating with Allende. ..."

"The unity and constitutional impartiality of the military was under immediate threat. ..."

"The population must be fed, which in turn made it imperative that truckers be put back to work and seeding and fertilizing of the year's crops proceed in some semblance of civil order."

.........

"Press reports reaching Argentina indicate the cabinet will be entirely military. I consider this a hopeful sign that the armed forces are determined to avoid becoming identified with any political current and course most conducive to obtaining the support I am sure they will week
from the workers.

    "It would be a mistake to consider the action the military took as a 'rightist coup'."

        "Now that the coup has occurred, according to press reports here, the (Christian Democrats) party has instructed members to declined positions in the government
        "I interpret this as an indication that the Christian Democratic Party, while not willing to participate probably in practice will cooperate with the junta in setting the stage for future elections."
        "This, too, is a positive development for had they chosen to actively oppose it, the position of the junta would have been perilous indeed.
        "Some stubborn extreme left resistance obviously continues and may persist for a long time but I assume that moderates of all political persuasions will tend to swing behind the interim government if for no other reason than the alternative now seems to be civil was and utter chaos.

        "After I can return to Santiago, I will try to assess the extent of the junta's effective control. However, on present reading and at this distance I can see no useful purpose in withholding recognition unduly.
        "Indeed such action might even tend to delay Chile's eventual return to democratic process.
        "From my knowledge of views of senior military officers, unlike Brazilian or Peruvian models, they could intend to turn government back to civil authority with the minimum of delay feasible."

Toronto Star, September 26, 1973

The revelation of Ambassador Ross' secret cable to Mitchell Sharp has evoked relatively little response in the Canadian press. One commentary by James Ears, a leading Canadian professor of international relations and a syndicated columnist, had this to say:

    What advice did our ambassador to Chile give about the violent overthrow of Salvador Allende's presidency? ... The Toronto Star--which saw fit to publish it last weed. Canadians can now judge for themselves the quality of the intelligence by which the Trudeau cabinet forms its foreign policy decisions.

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The coup--so the ambassador alleged--avoided civil was. The trucks would run again. (Just as the trains would run on time, as admirers of the early Mussolini's Italy were fond of pointing out.)

But this--so our ambassador assured our government--was no take over by fascists. 'It would be a mistake to consider the action the military took as a 'rightest coup'. ... From my knowledge of views of senior officers, unlike Brazilian or Peruvian models, they would intend to turn government back to civil authority with the minimum delay feasible.'

The ambassador's policy recommendation? To recognize the regime of the junta as soon as possible. 'I can see no useful purpose in withholding recognition unduly. Indeed such action might even tend to delay Chile's eventual return to democratic process.'

In short, our ambassador assesses the junta's personnel not as a savage pack of saboteurs but as a sturdy band of saviors of Chilean constitutionalism, whose motives are pure, whose cause is just, whose efforts are deserving of our support.

The dispatch's addressee -- the ambassador's boss, the secretary of state for External Affairs--happens to be a former senior executive of Brascan, a firm which as much as ITT hates all Allende stood for.

That may be more coincidence. But not the fact that the dispatch's arguments for favoring the military takeover ("disintegration of normal institutional system has brought the country to the verge of anarchy and ... the armed forces command structure offered the only apparently viable temporary alternative") are precisely those that will be deployed if the Parti Quebecois attains power through free elections only to have that power eroded by political turmoil and economic dislocation.

Toronto Star, October 3, 1973

Eayrs might have added that not only the Parti Quebecois but also any federal or provincial government in Canada which in the future may have thoughts about nationalizing industries or aims of some fundamental social changes, should also think about the possible response of senior 'civil servants' and the entrenched powers in Canada.

Interestingly, Eayrs cites the External Affairs Register which notes that Ambassador Ross was, previous to his joining the External Affairs department, employed by the Canadian Intelligence Service. It would be important to know if this is the 'Canadian Intelligence Service', a private, far-right political group composed of influential persons, and analogous to the John Birch Society in the United States.
If the following accounts of the actions of the Canadian ambassador and Canadian embassy in Chile are correct (and similar accounts come from a number of separate sources) the Canadian government is implicated in and countenanced the arrest and possible murder of Chilean refugees whom it could have protected. Is this included in what is known as "non-committal recognition?"

_While thousands of workers and Allende supporters are being systematically rounded up and killed, the Canadian embassy has "locked their doors" to 250 to 300 political refugees seeking asylum, according to Tim Draimin, a member of the Latin American Working Group._

_Draimin learned from an External Affairs official that the Canadian government has accepted only two applicants to emigrate to Canada. The official is reported to have said that the Canadian government will not offer asylum to "free loaders"._

_Draimin also learned that the Department of External Affairs has consented to shelter any person the United Nations referred to the Canadian ambassador. However, he reported that when a UN official asked the Canadian embassy to put p 200 refugees overnight, the ambassador "hemmed and hawed and demanded to know who they were." He subsequently denied them entry._

University of Toronto 'Varsity', October 3, 1973

By the end of September, deputations of church leaders, labor organizations, community groups and others in Canada in conjunction with appeals from the international community and from many western European nations, gave the Canadian government some pause. A month after the coup, the Department of Immigration sent one Remo Caldato to Santiago to interview prospective refugees. This was to counter some of the "bad publicity" arising from the publication of the Canadian ambassador's dispatch supporting the coup.

The assistant deputy minister of immigration, a Mrs. Gene Edmunds said (from Ottawa), "So far there has been no demand from the people in Chile to come to Canada." However, C.T.V. news team accompanying Caldato's visit to the Canadian embassy in Santiago found that the doors to the embassy were kept locked and bolted; only persons showing valid Canadian passports were admitted. Chilean military police were called by embassy officials should non-Canadian refugees attempt to enter. Specifically, there were accounts of five Uruguayans seeking refuge and...
five Brazilians: they had all been expelled from the embassy and some had immediately fallen into the hands of the police and we were not heard from again. (*Toronto Star*, October 8 and 11)

By the end of October 1973, almost two months after the coup and with sufficient time for the Chilean junta to eliminate most of its primary victims, the Canadian embassy and the Department of Immigration had still only cleared about a dozen Chileans for immigration to Canada. Carefully screened, of course, and processed with deliberate speed.

The hand-in-glove cooperation of the Canadian government with the Chilean putschists, furthermore, is representative of the attitudes of probably substantial numbers of Canadians (if daily letters to the editor are any gauge). We have our own truck owners associations, small and large businessman, professionals and others of the arrived and aspirant middle class who recognize their brethren in the "new Chile". A particularly open and honest statement of their position is that made by Judy Lamarch, former cabinet minister in the Pearson Liberal government. *Equating activists for substantial social change and the victims of fascism as "revolutionaries and communists"* she says:

> Oceans of ink have flowed in the past few months in criticism of Andrew Ross, our ambassador to Chile. He had been condemned as being unreflective of the true Canadian spirit of warmly welcoming all those who seek entry to this country. I find that criticism unfair. He is simply following the continuing Canadian policy of selective immigration.

> I doubt that Canadians as a whole, many of whom came here originally to escape a Communist homeland, have any desire to import "communist revolutionaries" to add to our already considerable domestic problems.

> Most Canadians don't want a Communist government in Canada—whether elected or enforced by revolution. It seems to be contrary to the national consensus to import those whose very purpose would be to try to change the political status quo. That's what Canadian immigration policy is all about and that policy Alexander Ross is required to follow."

*Toronto Star*, December 1973

If you try to change the political status quo of Canada or another country, by elections or other means, if you support an elected government which attempts to change that status quo, you know what to expect from the ministers of that status quo. Lamarch's column is virtually a duplicate of similar editorials which emanated from the Canadian press and from Canadian notables during the 1930s which were
part of the successful move to block entry of refugees from fascist
dictatorships in Europe to Canada. No, not many Canadian immigrants of
an anti-fascist background ever got by "our" immigration officials.

REMEMBER THIS

It was not just another Latin American coup, and Chile was not just
another Latin American country. With its large middle class, its long and
proud democratic traditions and its record of political stability, Chile is
one of the most advanced nations on the continent. Ever since Allende
took office three years ago the world has been an avid spectator of his
slow-motion revolution. Above all, he had sought to prove that there was
nothing incompatible between Marxist and political freedom.

..........

Salvador Allende Gossins was committed to Marxist and democracy,
and he wouldn't listen. Not even in recent weeks when the word
"Jakarta"--an ominous allusion to the 1965 army massacre of tens of
thousands of Communists (and hundreds of thousands of progressive
people) in faraway Indonesia--began appearing on the walls of Santiago.

Newsweek, September 24, 1973

In Latin America the Chilean putsch can be seen as the capstone to the
reactionary tide of military and fascist dictatorships which have engulfed
almost every country on that continent in the last ten years.

Milio Gaspero, of Argentina, secretary general of the Latin American
trade union organization CLAT, told a press conference in Geneva: "If
fascist succeeds in Chile, it is the beginning of a long night of fascism in
Latin America."... "The coup is a triumph for international capitalism,
imperialism, money and multi-national companies"

Globe and Mail, September 23, 1973

And as a terrible lesson that all dependent countries might consider, a
leading economist (Osvaldo Sunkel) speaking at the United Nations said:

"The government of President Allende made an attempt at changing
this structure of underdevelopment and dependence," Professor Sunkel
said. "It may have had many failings and committed many errors, but
nobody can deny that it attempted to redress this economic and social
structure by fundamentally democratic means."

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"The conclusion for us here seems to be that it is not possible to try to restructure relations of dependence between underdeveloped countries and the transnational capitalist system in a peaceful way."

New York Times, September 14, 1973

In Europe as well, similar questions were being raised as to whether the status quo would ever allow a peaceful transition to socialism, whether the status quo would ever accept the decision of the ballot box if capitalism were threatened.

The Communists are the biggest party in Italy. They are committed to taking power through the ballot box, on a program little fiercer than Michael Foot might design. Now comes the shock of Chile. Italy, too, has property owners and an army which has shown recently that it is far from immune to right wing politics. Italian Communists (and others) today must be asking themselves whether, if they are elected to govern, they will be allowed to do so. ... Unwittingly, the Chilean generals have made a formidable case for armed revolution rather than for peaceful evolution towards socialist democracy.

London Observer, September 16. 1973

And also,

.....the sharpest cries of outrage came from Western Europe--where leftist parties had viewed Chile as a possible pattern for their own emergences into power. More than 300,000 demonstrators took to the streets in Italy, and in France, where a Socialist-Communist alliance was formed for the last national election, key politicians were visibly shaken. Socialist leader, Francois Mitterrand, said the Chilean experiment proved that "the right an capital will never accept the popular will."

Newsweek, September 24, 1973

What about the status quo in Canada, and its defenders? Would they opt for a fascist coup rather than allow a democratic transition to socialism in the event that a socialist government was freely elected to office? There is, of course, no socialist party in Canada which would ever pursue such a goal. But that is what fascism "in Chile" is also about.